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WHAT'S INCLUDED IN THE EXCLUSION:
UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND'S
PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
CHRISTOPHER D. KNOPF*
INTRODUCTION
N 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act1  (CERCLA or
Superfund) in recogmtion of the threat to the environment posed by
sites contaminated with hazardous substances.2 Although now more
than a decade old, the liability provisions of CERCLA continue to
remain a source of confusion.3 One of the enduring questions in this
regard is the scope of the exclusion within CERCLA for releases of
"petroleum,"4 a term which Congress did not define in the statutory
language.
* B.S.F.S., Georgetown Umversity, 1985; J.D., University of Virginia, 1989.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and Titles 10, 29, 33, and
42 of the United States Code).
2. See H.R. R-P. No. 253 (III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038 ("CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a hazard-
ous substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and (2)
to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups."); see also Artesian
Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F Supp. 1269, 1277 (D. Del.
1987) (noting the broad purposes of Congress in enacting CERCLA), affd, 851 F.2d
643 (3d Cir. 1988); for an overview of the legislative history of CERCLA, see gener-
ally Frank P Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1 (1982).
3. For a discussion of the various CERCLA liability issues, see, e.g., Christopher
D. Knopf, Breaking New Ground. Recovery of Transaction Costs in Private CERCLA
Cost-Recovery Actions, 28 WiLLAMEITE L. RE-v 495 (1992) (recovery of attorneys'
fees and other transaction costs as CERCLA response costs); James A. King, Kayser-
Roth, Joslyn, and the Problem of Parent Corporation Liability Under CERCLA, 25
AKRON L. REv 123 (1991) (analyzing parent corporation liability under CERCLA
for response costs caused by subsidiaries); Elizabeth A. Wolford, Note, Lender Liabil-
ity Under CERCLA. Interpreting the Security Interest Exemption Using Common-
Law Principles of Lender Liability, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv 1161 (1992) (lender
liability under CERCLA); Randall J. Burke, Note, Much Ado About Lending: Con-
tinuing Vitality of the Fleet Factors Decision, 80 GEo. L.J. 809 (1992) (lender liability
under CERCLA); Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and
Environmental Laws, 46 Bus. LAW. 623, 634-65 (1991) (analyzing CERCLA liability
issues in bankruptcy); Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste
Cleanup and Damages, 99 HARV L. REv 986 (1986) (arguing for parent corporation
liability for CERCLA response costs of subsidiaries).
4. CERCLA § 101(14) (providing for an exclusion from CERCLA liability for
petroleum in the definition of the term "hazardous substance").
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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and courts have been
left with the task of determining the scope of the petroleum exclu-
sion.5 A broad understanding is emerging from the regulatory and
judicial interpretations of the petroleum exclusion that uncontani-
nated gasoline and other fuels are within the petroleum exclusion,
such that CERCLA liability does not attach to releases of these sub-
stances.6 A consensus also is emerging that used oil, 7 solvents and
other petroleum products to which hazardous substances have been
added or increased in concentration during use are outside the petro-
leum exclusion; accordingly, releases of these substances result in
CERCLA liability.8
There remains, however, an enormous gap in this analytical frame-
work for releases of used oil at a Superfund site where no direct evi-
dence exists on the contamnnants present in the used oil. This
situation arises where used oil was managed at a Superfund site and
there was evidence of contamination by hazardous substances at the
site, but there is no evidence which identifies the contaminants in the
used oil as hazardous substances. Although the owner or operator of
the site is liable under CERCLA for the contamination by hazardous
substances,9 the owner or operator may be bankrupt ° or otherwise
unable to finance the clean-up of the site. CERCLA liability also at-
taches to generators and transporters" of hazardous substances re-
leased at a site. However, if the generators, the transporters, or the
5. See infra notes 44-86 and accompanying text (reviewing EPA's interpretation
of the petroleum exclusion) and notes 87-138 and accompanying text (reviewing the
judicial treatment of the petroleum exclusion).
6. See infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (EPA interpretations) and 87-100
(judicial interpretations).
7. Tis Article uses the term "used oil" to refer to oil that has been used and/or
contaminated such that it is unfit for its intended use without recycling or processing.
This understanding of the meaning of "used oil" is consistent with EPA's definition
for "used oil" under the hazardous waste statute, which defines "used oil" to mean
"any oil which has been - (A) refined from crude oil, (B) used, and (C) as a result of
such use, contamnnated by physical or chemical impurities." Used Oil Recycling Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-463 § 3, 94 Stat. 2055 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (1988)).
EPA interprets the term "waste oil" to include "both used and unused oils that may
no longer be used for their original purpose." See Hazardous Waste Management
System; Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Recycled Used Oil Manage-
ment Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566, 41,567 n.1 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
279) [hereinafter Hazardous Waste Management System]. For purposes of analyzing
the scope of the petroleum exclusion, this Article includes "waste oil" within the
meaning of "used oil." In doing so, this Article effectively treats these terms as
synonyms.
8. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (EPA interpretations) and notes
101-110 and accompanying text (judicial interpretations).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1988). For further discussion of the parties liable
under CERCLA, see infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the interaction of bankruptcy law and CERCLA, see Bank-
ruptcy and Environmental Law, supra note 3.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (1988). For further discussion of the categories of
parties liable under CERCLA, see infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
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site owner or operator did not maintain documentation on the compo-
sition of used oil brought to the site, there is the possibility that the
used oil generators and transporters will escape CERCLA liability
under the petroleum exclusion due to the inability to link these gener-
ators and transporters to the hazardous substances at the site. Given
the significant number of Superfund sites at which used oil has been
managed, 2 this analytical gap has significant repercussions on the
clean-up and allocation of liability at many Superfund sites.
This Article analyzes the scope of the petroleum exclusion and ar-
gues for the creation of a rebuttable presumption that used oil is con-
tanunated with a hazardous substance, so that CERCLA liability
attaches to releasers of used oil, despite the lack of evidence of con-
tamnants in the oil. This Article demonstrates that congressional pol-
icy, fairness, and probability support the creation of such a
presumption. Part I of this Article reviews the liability provisions of
CERCLA. Parts II and III summarize the EPA and judicial interpre-
tations of the petroleum exclusion. Part IV uses the plain meaning of
the statutory language and the legislative history of CERCLA to sup-
port the framework created by both EPA and the courts that uncon-
taminated gasoline and other fuels are within the exclusion, while
used oil and other petroleum products contaminated by hazardous
substances remain outside the exclusion. Part V provides the basis for
creating a rebuttable presumption that used oil is contaminated with a
hazardous substance so that the petroleum exclusion will not apply
where there is no evidence of the identity of contaminants in the used
Oil.
I. LIABiLiTY UNDER CERCLA
To understand the importance of the petroleum exclusion, it is nec-
essary to review the statutory framework of CERCLA. CERCLA is
intended to fill in the gaps left by the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA),' 3 which Congress enacted in 1976 to establish a
"cradle to grave" approach to the management of hazardous waste.'4
12. See generally SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP., Summary of
Superfuind Sites with Used Oil Damages, (Aug. 3, 1992) (summarizing the damages
from used oil at fifty six Superfund sites). This study was prepared for EPA in con-
junction with EPA's determnation on the listing status of used oil under the hazard-
ous waste regulations. See Hazardous Waste Management System, supra note 7, at
41,576 n.5 (referring to a draft of the study noting the environmental problems caused
by the mismanagement of used oil). Congress has found that "used oil constitutes a
threat to public health and the environment when reused or disposed of improperly."
Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-463, § 2, 94 Stat. 2055.
13. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(h) (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
14. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249; see also Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Liti-
gation, 99 HARV. L. REv 1458, 1470-71 (1986) [hereinafter Toxic Waste Litigation]
(reviewing the regulation of hazardous waste under RCRA).
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Whereas RCRA is prospective in nature, CERCLA is retrospective
and provides for the clean up of sites already contaminated by hazard-
ous substances. 5 Under CERCLA, the federal or state government
or private parties may undertake to clean the Superfund sites.' 6 Pri-
vate parties may clean up Superfund sites either voluntarily or under
compulsion of a government order.'7
To finance government-sponsored clean ups, CERCLA estab-
lishes a "Superfund,"' I which is financed primarily through excise
taxes. 19 Because the Superfund is adequate to finance the clean
up of only a fraction of the sites contaminated by hazardous
substances,20 CERCLA section 107(a) enables the federal and state
governments and private parties to bring actions against poten-
15. See Richard C. Belthoff, Jr., Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107
of CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 142 (1986) (noting that CERCLA was
intended to address regulatory gaps left by RCRA).
16. See Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F Supp. 1233, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (observ-
ing that "response costs" can be incurred under CERCLA by two groups, the "gov-
ernment" and any "other person," including any "individual, firm, corporation,
association, partnership, consortium, joint venture [or] commercial entity"); Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gypsum, 711 F Supp. 1244, 1251 (D.N.J.
1989).
The statute embodies a bifurcated scheme to promote the cleanup of hazard-
ous sites, spills and releases. First, through the creation of Superfund, the
federal government is provided with the tools to respond to the growing
problems resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, the statute also
authorizes private parties to institute civil actions to recover the costs in-
volved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their
creation.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988) (enabling the President of the United States to
secure such relief as is necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the envi-
ronment from an "imminent and substantial endangerment" due to "an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility"). For the government to
maintain a claim under § 9606(a), it must establish the elements of liability required
by § 9607(a), and show that the contamination by a hazardous substance poses an
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the envi-
ronment. " Id. United States v. Bliss, 667 F Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987);
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F Supp. 1249, 1257-58 (S.D. Ill. 1984); see
infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the prima facie elements of liabil-
ity under § 9607(a)).
18. The Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund, or Superfund, was originally
funded pursuant to CERCLA § 221, 94 Stat. at 2801 (1988). SARA § 517(c), 100
Stat. at 1774, repealed this provision, and established a Hazardous Substance
Superfund under the Subchapter A of Chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.). SARA § 517(a), I.R.C. § 5907(a) (1988).
19. SARA § 517(a), I.R.C. § 5907(b) (1988); see Artesian Water, 659 F Supp. at
1277 (discussing uses of Superfund).
20. See Robert C. Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Con-
trol, 33 BAYLOR L. Rv 253, 263 (1981) ("the amount of the [Super]fund provided
for in the Act is too small to handle the gargantuan problem of controlling chemical
wastes"); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F Supp. 507, 518 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
("while CERCLA authorizes governmental cleanup of hazardous waste sites using
money provided by the Superfund, the Superfund is limited and cannot finance
cleanup of all the many hazardous waste sites nationwide"); United States v. Price,
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tially responsible parties (PRPs).21  Liability under CERCLA
section 107(a) is strict,' joint and several,' and retroac-
577 F Supp. 1103, 1112 & n.8 (D.N.J. 1983) (discussing the inadequacies of the
Superfund).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). While a private right of contribution under
§ 9607(a) was, and is, nearly universally recognized by the courts, SARA amended
CERCLA section 113 to expressly codify this private right of contribution. SARA 42
U.S.C. § 9613(b) (1988). See, e.g., Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F Supp. 1484,
1491-92 (D. Colo. 1985) (prior to enactment of SARA, holding that private party may
seek contribution under CERCLA)); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F Supp. 1425, 1428-
29 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (private party has right to recover response costs from third
parties).
22. CERCLA does not expressly impose strict liability. Instead, CERCLA sec-
tion 101(32) provides that "[t]he terms 'liable' and 'liability' under this subchapter
shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of
title 33 [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988). The
liability provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1321
(1988), has been interpreted as imposing strict liability. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co.
v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979) (imposing unlimited liability
where willful negligence or willful misconduct can be shown). Courts have repeatedly
concluded that CERCLA imposes strict liability. See United States v. R.W Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) (imposing strict liability under CERCLA to
the owner of a facility), cerL denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (Congress intended that responsible parties
be held strictly liable); Artesian Water, 659 F Supp. at 1277 ("[c]ourts have uniformly
imposed strict liability in construing the terms of [CERCLA] section 107(a)"); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986) (finding
that CERCLA section 107 imposes strict liability); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F Supp. 1283,
1290 (D.R.I. 1986) ("[c]ourts have universally acknowledged that Congress cre-
ated a strict liability scheme [in enacting CERCLA]"); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (applying
strict liability to CERCLA section 107(a)) [hereinafter NEPACCO], affd in part,
rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Price, 577 F Supp. at 1114 ("the strict
liability standard fits most closely with the legislative aims of CERCLA ") (cita-
tions omitted). For a discussion of the strict liability standard under CERCLA, see
Michael P Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CER-
CLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CAs- W REs. L. REv 65, 86 (1992).
23. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989) (adopting the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts approach to joint and several liability in a CERCLA
action), cert. denied sub nom., American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 493 U.S. 1071
(1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding
the imposition of joint and several liability), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (concluding that
the deletion from an earlier version of the bill of a proposed requirement that liability
under CERCLA be joint and several was not intended as a rejection of joint and
several liability, but instead was a decision to have the scope of liability determined
under common law principles). SARA confirmed that liability under CERCLA is
joint and several. See H.R. RP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 79-80 (1985), re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,2861-62 ("nothing in this bill is intended to change
the application of the uniform federal rule of joint and several liability enunciated by
the Chem-Dyne court").
Typically, courts have relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance in
applying joint and several liability under CERCLA. Id. For example, in considering
the scope of CERCLA liability, the court in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992), observed that Section 433(A) of the Restatement
provides that "when two or more joint tortfeasors acting independently cause a dis-
tinct or single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to
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tive,24 subject to the defenses that the release was caused solely by an
act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission by a third party unre-
lated to the defendant.25
each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the harm that the individual
tortfeasor has caused." United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252,268 (3d
Cir. 1992) (refernng to Section 433(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
Under Section 433(B) of the Restatement, a joint tortfeasor has the burden of dem-
onstrating that the harm can be apportioned. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433(B) (1965). Courts have repeatedly recognized the right of CERCLA defend-
ants to attempt to demonstrate that environmental harm is divisible. See, e.g., United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1993); Alcan, 964 F.2d
at 269-70; O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 181-82; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72; United States v.
Strmgfellow, 661 F Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F Supp. 162, 223 (D. Mo. 1985); Chem-Dyne, 572 F Supp. at 810.
However, there are no reported cases in which a CERCLA defendant has been suc-
cessful in making this demonstration. In O'Neil and Monsanto, the First and Fourth
Circuits, respectively, rejected the defendants' argument that the volume of waste
disposed at a CERCLA site provided a reasonable basis for apportioning liability.
O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 183 n.11; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172. In Monsanto, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the defendants failed to show a relationship between waste
volume, the release of hazardous substances, and the harm at the site. Monsanto, 858
F.2d at 172. The Monsanto court noted that the relative toxicity, migratory potential,
and the synergistic capacity of the hazardous substances at the site would be relevant
to establishing the divisibility of harm. Id. at 172 n.26. Similarly, m O'Neil, the First
Circuit rejected the defendants' attempt to allocate liability on a volumetric basis,
stating that the position would require the "untenable" position that the cost of re-
moving the barrels did not vary depending upon their content. O'Neil, 883 F.2d at
182-83 & n.11. The O'Neil court also found that because of the commingling of waste
in the soil, any attempt to apportion the costs of removing the contaminated soil
would be arbitrary. Id.
24. See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 732-33 (applying CERCLA retroactively); United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F Supp. 546, 556-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1988)
(applying CERCLA retroactively). Cf Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1506 (applying SARA
retroactively).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp.,
546 F Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982) ("[l]iability for the specified response costs
under [§ 9607(a)] is absolute, subject only to the defenses listed m [§ 9607(b)]. ").
Courts have been nearly unanimous in rejecting the defense of unclean hands to
CERCLA liability. See AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip., 743 F Supp.
525, 530-31 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (plaintiff's fault in a CERCLA cost-recovery action is
not a defense, but is a factor that may be considered m equitably apportioning the
amount of contribution), rev'd on other grounds, 982 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1993); Allied
Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F Supp. 1100, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
("application of the doctrine of unclean hands would defeat the policies underlying
CERCLA"); but see Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F Supp. 1049, 1058 (D.
Ariz. 1984) (applying the doctrine of unclean hands), affd in part, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th
Cir. 1986). In affirming the court's decision in Mardan, the Ninth Circuit did not
reach the merits of raising the unclean hands defense. However, the Ninth Circuit
noted in a footnote that most courts have interpreted CERCLA section 107 as impos-
ing joint and several liability with a right of contribution. Id. at 1457 n.3. The opimon
of the district court in Mardan has been criticized repeatedly. See Smith Land &
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,90 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[d]octrmes such
as caveat emptor and '[un]clean hands,' which in some cases could bar relief regard-
less of the degree of culpability of the parties, do not comport with congressional
objectives [in enacting CERCLA]"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989); AM Int'l, 743
F Supp. at 530 ("[a]s plaintiff points out, the opinion of the district court in Mardan
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The elements of a prima facie claim26 against a private party under
CERCLA section 107(a) are: (1) the defendant is within one of four
categories of "covered persons;" 27 (2) there was a "release or
threatened release" s of a "hazardous substance;" (3) the plaintiff in-
has been strongly criticized"); Allied, 691 F Supp. at 1119 ("[t]he [district court] rul-
ing m Mardan goes too far").
26. For an overview of the prima facie elements of liability under § 9607(a), see
Dedham Water, 889 F.2d at 1150; Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 711 F Supp. 784, 789-90 (D.N.J. 1989). See also Versatile Metals v. Union
Corp., 693 F Supp. 1563, 1574 (E.D. Pa. 1988); T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp.,
680 F. Supp. 696, 708 (D.NJ. 1988); Artesian Water, 659 F Supp. at 1278-79.
27 The four categories of covered persons are: 1) the owner or operator of a
facility; 2) a person who owned or operated a facility during which time the disposal
of a hazardous substance occurred; 3) any person who arranged for the disposal, treat-
ment or transportation of hazardous substances that contaminated the facility, and 4)
any person who accepted for disposal, treatment or transportation the hazardous sub-
stances that contaminated the facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988) (establishing
four categories of "covered persons"). See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text
(discussing the categories of parties liable under CERCLA); see also Dedham Water,
889 F.2d at 1150-51 (discussing the categories of "covered person" under CERCLA
and concluding that "current owners, former owners, generators, or transporters, may
be held liable if there is a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from
the relevant facility").
With respect to the second category of covered persons, prior owners or operators
are liable only if they owned or operated the facility at the time the disposal of a
hazardous substance occurred. Thus, in Cadillac Fairview/Califorma, Inc. v. Dow
Chem., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 1984), modified, 21 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1584 (C.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 840 F.2d 691 (9th
Cir. 1988), the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim where the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant was the owner of
the facility during the time that disposals of hazardous substances were made. See
Richard C. Belthoff, Jr., Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of CER-
CLA, 11 CoLuM. J. ENmvL. L. 141, 159-60 (1986) (discussing the Cadillac Fairview
decision).
The statutory language requires the release to occur from a "facility." CERCLA
defines the term "facility" broadly to encompass "almost every place that a hazardous
substance could find its way into." T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F Supp.
696, 708 (D.NJ. 1988) (citation omitted). See CERCLA § 101(9) (1988) (defining
"facility" to mean any "pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill [or] storage
container" or "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of or placed, or otherwise come to be located. "); see also United
States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F Supp. 595, 613 (E.D. Ark. 1987) ("courts have
read this definition [of facility] broadly"), affid, United States v. Hercules, Inc., 961
F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1992).
28. The term "release" includes virtually any means by which a hazardous sub-
stance might enter the environment, including spilling, leaking, pouring, emitting, dis-
charging or disposing. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988) (defining the term "release").
Reflecting the broad liability provisions of CERCLA, a party may be liable for a
threatened release. See United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F Supp. 742,
747 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (concluding that large quantities of abandoned hazardous
wastes and chemicals constitute a threatened release), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
R.W Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1057 (1990).
See discussion supra note 11, where the prior owner or operator is liable if the
"disposal" of a hazardous substance occurred during its ownership or operation of the
facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988). CERCLA defines the term "disposal" sepa-
rately from the term "release." See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988) (defing "disposal"
1993]
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curred "response costs; 29 and (4) the response costs were consistent
with the National Contingency Plan (NCP).30 The petroleum exclu-
sion is an exclusion from the defimtion of "hazardous substance,"
which is a component of the third prima facie element of CERCLA
liability. CERCLA section 101(14) defines "hazardous substance" by
referencing several other environmental statutes,31 including the
by cross-referencing 42 U.S.C. § 6903). "Disposal" is broadly defined to include the
discharge, spilling, leaking or placing "of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or
on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land
or water that such waste may enter the environment. " 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)
(1988). Thus, the term "disposal" can be equated with the term "release" for pur-
poses of CERCLA liability.
29. The terms "respond" and "response" mean "remove, removal, remedy, and
remedial action. " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988). CERCLA defines the terms "re-
move" and "removal" to mean cleanup actions taken m the event of a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances, including actions necessary to monitor
and assess the release, actions to secure or limit access to the site, and the evacuation
of threatened individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). CERCLA defines "remedy"
and "remedial action" to mean those actions consistent with a permanent remedy for
releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, such as actions to confine the
release through dikes, trenches, or ditches, dredging or excavation operations, mom-
toring to assure that the public health is protected and the permanent relocation of
residences and businesses. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1988).
In short, removal actions are intended for the short-term abatement of hazardous
waste contamination, whereas remedial actions are intended to restore the long-term
environmental quality of the site. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F Supp. 609,
614 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1040). For an analysis of the
basis for recovery of attorneys' fees and other transaction costs as CERCLA response
costs, see Knopf, supra note 3.
30. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) establishes specific requirements that
the government and private parties must follow before they can recover response
costs. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700 (1992) (establishing criteria for determining when pri-
vate-party response action is consistent with the NCP).
Much of the case law analyzing the burden of proof in CERCLA cost-recovery
actions has involved consideration of the fourth element. The widely accepted rule
established by these cases is that, in a cost-recovery action brought by private party,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the costs are consistent with the NCP,
whereas, in a cost-recovery action brought by the government, the defendant bears
the burden of proving that the response costs were inconsistent with the NCP See
NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 746 (in a government-sponsored CERCLA cleanup, the de-
fendant has burden of demonstrating that response costs are inconsistent with the
NCP); United States v. Hardage, 733 F Supp. 1424, 1433 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (defend-
ant mn a CERCLA cost-recovery action brought by the federal government has the
burden of demonstrating that the response costs were arbitrary and capricious); City
of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem., 713 F Supp. 1484, 1486-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (defend-
ant m a government-sponsored CERCLA cost-recovery action has the burden of
demonstrating that the response costs were inconsistent with the NCP; whereas a pri-
vate party must prove as an element of its prima facie case that the response costs
were consistent with the NCP). See also Artesian Water, 659 F Supp. at 1278-79.
31. In particular, § 101(14) provides that
[t]he term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pur-
suant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33 [section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act)], (B) any element,
compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section
9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identi-
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Clean Water Act,32 the Clean Air Act3 3 and RCRA.34 Pursuant to
these statutory grants of authority, EPA has promulgated several lists
of "hazardous" or "toxic" substances.35 CERCLA section 101(14) re-
quires that a substance be designated as hazardous or toxic only under
one of the referenced statutory provisions to be a hazardous substance
under CERCLA.36 CERCLA section 101(14) also provides that the
term "hazardous substance" includes those hazardous substances des-
ignated by EPA under CERCLA section 102.37 Pursuant to CER-
CLA section 102, EPA has promulgated a list of hazardous substances
and reportable quantities that is codified at 40 C.F.R. Table 302.4.38
The list of substances codified by EPA at 40 C.F.R. Table 302.4 is an
effort to provide a comprehensive compilation of CERCLA "hazard-
ous substances. ' 39 Nevertheless, m the event that EPA inadvertently
ontted a substance identified as hazardous or toxic under one of the
other environmental statutes referenced in CERCLA section 101(14)
from Table 302.4, this substance would be a "hazardous substance" for
fled under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act
[which amended RCRA] ., (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section
1317(a) of title 33 [section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act], (E) any hazard-
ous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.
§ 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture
with respect to which the Administrator [of U.S. EPA] has taken action pur-
suant to section 2606 of title 15 [the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)].
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
32. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
33. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988).
35. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.01(a) (1992) (list of "hazardous air pollutants" under the
Clean Air Act § 112); Table 116.4 (list of "hazardous substances" under the Clean
Water Act § 311(b)(2)(A)); §§ 261.30-261.33 (list of "hazardous wastes" under RCRA
§ 3001); and § 401.15 (list of "toxic pollutants" under the Clean Water Act § 307).
36. United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2125 (D.S.C.
1984); accord Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (a "sub-
stance is a 'hazardous substance' within the meaning of CERCLA if it qualifies under
any of" the statutory definitional requirements).
37 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(B) (1988).
38. 40 C.F.R. Table 302.4 (1992).
39. In analyzing the meaning of the term "hazardous substance" under § 9601(14),
the court in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 990 F.2d 711 (1993) observed that
each of the elements, compounds and hazardous wastes appear on the Table
302.4 List of Hazardous Substances by virtue of one or more of four statu-
tory sources - to wit, sections 307(a) and 311(b)(4) of the Clean Water Act,
section 112 of the Clean Air Act and section 3001 of the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act. Table 302.4, then, appears to be nothing more
than a compilation of hazardous substances so designated already under the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act.
755 F Supp. at 537 (citations omitted). See Cose, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20399 at *8
(9th Cir. Aug. 11, 1993) (referrng to 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 as a "comprehensive listing of
CERCLA hazardous substances").
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the purpose of determining CERCLA liability.4° Furthermore,
although certain statutes referenced in section 101(14) of CERCLA
and Table 302.4 set forth "reportable quantities" or "effluent stan-
dards" for the substances listed, courts have repeatedly concluded that
CERCLA section 101(14) does not require a substance be present in a
certain amount or concentration before it is deemed to be a "hazard-
ous substance."41 After defining the term "hazardous substance" by
40. Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2125 (D.S.C. 1984); Eagle-Picher In-
dus., 759 F.2d at 922 (D.C. Cir. 1985); City of New York v. Exxon, 744 F Supp. 474
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
41. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 721 (the reportable quantities at 40 C.F.R. Table 302.4 "only
go to reporting requirements, they do not address the issue of CERCLA liability");
Alcan, 964 F.2d at 262 (the absence of reportable quantities for some compounds
listed at 40 C.F.R. Table 302.4 is irrelevant to CERCLA liability); Amoco Oil Co. v.
Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664,669 (5th Cir. 1989); Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 774 F Supp.
566, 571 (D. Ariz. 1991) ("CERCLA does not impose any quantitative requirement
on what constitutes a 'hazardous substance"'); United States v. Western Processing
Co., 761 F Supp. 713,722 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (quoting Western Processing Co., 734 F
Supp. at 936) ("CERCLA does not impose any quantitative requirement on the term
'hazardous substance"'); Exxon, 744 F Supp. at 484 (There is no indication in CER-
CLA that liability does not attach to concentrations below the reportable quanti-
ties"); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 735 F Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Wash.
1990) ("CERCLA fails to impose any quantitative requirement on what constitutes a
'hazardous substance"'); Hassayampa Steering Comm. v. Arizona, 32 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1385, 1391 (D. Ariz. 1989) and Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. at 2126 n.3 ("if
Congress had intended the definition of hazardous substances to be contingent upon
the presence of a certain amount or concentration of a hazardous substance, it would
have so provided); United States v. Wade, 577 F Supp. 1326, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(refusing to read the Clean Water Act's effluent standards and reportable quantities
into CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance").
The Carolawn court also observed that "CERCLA's legislative history further sup-
ports the conclusion that the listing of a substance as hazardous, not its concentration
or amount, was to control in identifying hazardous substances under CERCLA." 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2126. As support, the Carolawn court cited the Senate
Report to the CERCLA legislation:
[s]ubstances listed as hazardous or toxic under certain other Federal laws are
incorporated by reference and upon the date of enactment of this bill such
substances become statutorily defined as hazardous substances for purposes
of this bill. And the release of any of them or any constituent of them in-
yokes the response provisions and any costs of removal or remedial ac-
tion or any damages are subject to the liability provision of the bill. As
substances are added to [the] lists they would be automatically designated as
hazardous substances.
21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2126 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at
24-27 (1980)), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119 (emphasis added by the court); see
Exxon, 744 F Supp. at 484 (quoting Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2125).
A related issue (but separate from the question of whether a substance must be
present in a certain quantity to be a CERCLA "hazardous substance") is determining
whether a substance is "listed" in 40 C.F.R. Table 302.4 as a hazardous substance.
Tis issue arises because Table 302.4 contains generic listings for substances such as
"chromium and compounds", "copper and compounds", "lead and compounds" and
"zinc and compounds" without providing reportable quantities for these substances.
Courts which have considered this issue have determined that, although no reportable
quantities are specified for these generic categories of substances, these substances
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referencing other environmental statutes, section 101(14) of CER-
CLA provides the following exclusion for petroleum:
[t]he term [hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, m-
cluding crude oil or any fraction thereof winch is not otherwise spe-
cifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does
not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or
synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).42
CERCLA does not provide definitions for the terms "petroleum,"
"crude oil," "fraction" or "natural gas."'4 Thus, the difficult task of
determining the scope of the petroleum exclusion has been left to
EPA and the courts.
II. EPA INTERPRETATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
EPA has issued a series of rulemakings and memoranda interpret-
ing the scope of the petroleum exclusion. In the first of these inter-
pretations, the 1981 Policy Statement" t issued shortly after the
enactment of CERCLA, EPA noted that several process wastestreams
related to petroleum refimng are specifically listed under RCRA as
hazardous waste, but concluded that petroleum wastes, such as waste
oil, winch are not specifically listed as a hazardous waste under
RCRA, are within CERCLA's petroleum exclusion.45
are nevertheless "hazardous substances" under CERCLA. See Exxon, 766 F Supp. at
177, 181-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Alcan, 755 F Supp. at 538.
Tins conclusion is supported by the rulemaking establishing Table 302.4 m which
EPA found that a person is "liable for the cleanup of releases of hazardous substances
which fall under any of the broad, generic classes, but does not have to report such
releases when the specific compounds, and hence the [reportable quantities], are not
listed in Table 302.4." Notification Requirements; Reportable Quantity Adjustments,
50 Fed. Reg. 13,456, 13,461 (EPA final rule 1985). The rationale for this determma-
tion is that it would be inappropriate to establish single reportable quantities for each
of the generic categories of substances because each category could encompass hun-
dreds or even thousands of compounds with varying toxicity characteristics. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
43. James Bailer, The Petroleum Exclusion - Stronger Than Ever After Wilshire
Westwood, 43 Sw. L.J. 915, 918 (1990); see Cose, 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1311
("[t]here is no CERCLA definition of 'petroleum' ").
44. CERCLA section 103(c) Reporting Requirements, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,144,22,145
(EPA policy statement 1981).
45. The relevant portion of the 1981 Policy Statement provides that
[o]ther petroleum wastes, including waste oil, are not specifically listed m the
RCRA regulations, but they may exhibit the characteristics of hazardous
waste and therefore be subject to full RCRA regulation. However, because
these wastes are excluded form the definition of "hazardous substance" by
the specific language of Superfund, regardless of their RCRA status, they
are not hazardous substances for purposes of the notification requirement of
[CERCLAI Section 103(c).
46 Fed. Reg. 22,145.
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A December 2, 1982 EPA memorandum46 concluded that the petro-
leum exclusion includes diesel oil spills47 and hazardous substances
inherent in petroleum.48 Nevertheless, the 1982 Memorandum noted
that hazardous substances which are added to, or mixed with, petro-
leum products are covered by CERCLA, even though these hazard-
ous substances are otherwise indigenous in petroleum.49 Thus, the
1982 Memorandum found that polychlormated biphenyls (PCBs)
nmxed with oil, pesticides contained m an oil-based carrier or propel-
lant, and oil-based paints and solvents are outside the petroleum
exclusion.50
Consistent with the 1982 Memorandum, an August 13, 1983 EPA
memorandum5' determined that the petroleum exclusion covers gaso-
line spills. 52 On the basis of the plain meaning53 of the term "petro-
leum,"54 the 1983 Memorandum found that the petroleum exclusion
covers blended gasoline used as automotive fuel.5 The 1983 Memo-
randum rejected a narrow interpretation of the petroleum exclusion
which would have limited the exclusion to raw gasoline separated
from crude oil during the first stage of the refimng process.5 6
An April 4, 1985 rulemaking5 7 clarifying the CERCLA reporting
requirements observed that the petroleum exclusion covers "crude oil,
petroleum feedstocks, and refined petroleum products," even if a haz-
ardous substance is indigenous in such products.58 However, the 1985
46. Memorandum from Robert M. Perry, EPA Associate Admimstrator and Gen-
eral Counsel, to Dick Whittington, EPA Region VI Administrator (Dec. 2, 1982)
[hereinafter 1982 Memorandum].
47 Id. at 1.
48. In particular, the 1982 Memorandum states that:
[b]ecause the exemption does not apply to fractions of oil which are hazard-
ous substances, an argument could be made that all fractions of petroleum
which are hazardous substances would come under CERCLA's jurisdiction.
Since some hazardous substances such as benzene and toluene are present in
all petroleum products and are often virtually impossible to separate from
those products, no oil or petroleum product would be exempted under such
an approach. This result would virtually nullify the petroleum
exemption.
Id. at 2.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Memorandum from A. James Barnes, EPA Acting General Counsel, to Shel-
don M. Novick, EPA Region III Counsel (Aug. 13, 1983) [hereinafter 1983
Memorandum].
52. Id. at 3-4.
53. See nfra notes 142-55 and accompanying text (analyzing the plain meamng of
the petroleum exclusion).
54. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of the
terms "petroleum" and "petroleum fractions").
55. 1983 Memorandum, supra note 51, at 5.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Notification Requirements; Reportable Quantity Adjustments, 50 Fed. Reg.
13,456, 13,460 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Rulemaking].
58. In the pertinent portion, the 1985 Rulemaking provides that:
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Rulemakmg did not consider "materials such as waste oil to which
listed CERCLA substances have been added to be within the petro-
leum exclusion."5 9 In addition, the 1985 Rulemakmg noted that pesti-
cides are outside the petroleum exclusion, even if the active ingredient
of a pesticide is contained in a petroleum product. 60 Consequently,
the 1985 Rulemakmg narrowed the 1981 Policy Statement which could
have been interpreted to include within the petroleum exclusion all
"waste oil," even waste oil contaminated with listed hazardous
substances.
After reviewing the legislative history of CERCLA61 and consider-
ing prior EPA interpretations of the petroleum exclusion, a July 31,
1987 EPA memorandum62 determined that:
the petroleum exclusion is explained as an exclusion from CER-
CLA for spills or releases only of oil. The legislative history clearly
contemplates that the petroleum exclusion will not apply to mix-
tures of petroleum and other toxic materials since these would not
be releases "strictly of oil." 6 3
The 1987 Memorandum rejected the argument that petroleum con-
taminated during normal use is within the petroleum exclusion; a thus,
the 1987 Memorandum is consistent with the 1985 Rulemaking and
repudiates the interpretation of the petroleum exclusion in the 1981
Policy Statement. In a footnote, the 1987 Memorandum stated that in
the 1985 Rulemakmg it had interpreted the term "waste oil" as includ-
ing "only unadulterated waste oil. ' '65 While this interpretation is a
broad gloss on the actual language of the 1985 Rulemakmg, the effect
of this footnote is to provide a basis for concluding that EPA has cre-
ated a presumption that used oil is not contamnated with hazardous
substances.
EPA interprets the petroleum exclusion to apply to materials such as crude
oil, petroleum feedstocks, and refined petroleum products, even if a specifi-
cally listed or designated hazardous substance is present m such products.
However, EPA does not consider materials such as waste oil to wich listed
CERCLA substances have been added to be within the petroleum exclusion.
Similarly, pesticides are not within the petroleum exclusion, even though the
active ingredient of the pesticide may be contained m a petroleum
distillate..
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See infra notes 151-78 and accompanying text (analyzing the effect of the legis-
lative istory of CERCLA on the scope of the petroleum exclusion).
62. Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, EPA General Counsel, to J. Winston
Porter, EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response (July
31, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Memorandum].
63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 3 n.2.
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A. Regulation of Used Oil
In 1980, Congress enacted the Used Oil Recycling Act 66 to en-
courage the recycling of used oil. Since the enactment of the Used
Oil Recycling Act, EPA has struggled with establishing management
standards for used oil, while at the same time providing incentives for
recycling used oil. Pursuant to the Used Oil Recycling Act and
RCRA, in November 1985, EPA proposed 68 to list all used oil69 as
hazardous waste. EPA noted that the "proposed listing of used oil
as a hazardous waste will, upon final promulgation, also result in its
classification as a hazardous substance under section 101(14) of
CERCLA. 70
Due to concerns that the stigmatic effects associated with a hazard-
ous waste listing might discourage the recycling of used oil, thereby
resulting in an increased improper disposal of used oil, EPA issued a
decision in 1986 not to list used oil as a hazardous waste to be re-
cycled.71 EPA observed that this decision would mean that recycled
used oil would not be subject to CERCLA, but that any hazardous
substances in used oil which are not normally found in refined petro-
leum factors, or are present in levels exceeding those generally found
in petroleum, would result in CERCLA liability.72 This conclusion
66. Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-463, 94 Stat. 2055 (1980).
67. In the Used Oil Recycling Act, Congress defined "used oil" to mean any oil
which has been:
(A) refined from crude oil,
(B) used, and
(C) as a result of such use, contaminated by physical or chemical
impurities.
RCRA § 1004(36) (1988).
68. Used Oil Management System and Listing as a Hazardous Waste, 50 Fed. Reg.
49,258 (EPA proposed rulemaking 1985).
69. The November 1985 proposed rulemaking defined "used oil" as:
petroleum-derived or synthetic oil including, but not limited to, oil which is
used as a: i) Lubncant (engine, turbine, or gear); ii) Hydraulic fluid (includ-
ing transmission fluid); iii) Metalworking fluid (including cutting, grinding,
machining, rolling, stamping, quenching, and coating oils;) [sic] or iv) Insu-
lating fluid or coolant, and which is contaminated through use or subsequent
management.
50 Fed. Reg. 49,261, 49,269 (proposed for codification at 40 C.F.R. § 260.10).
70. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,267.
71. Identification and Listing of Used Oil as Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,900, 41,901-02 (EPA decision not to adopt proposed rule 1986).
72. In particular, EPA stated:
recycled oil will not itself become a listed CERCLA hazardous substance.
However, hazardous substances present in any used oil which are either not
normally found in refined petroleum fractions or are present at levels ex-
ceeding those normally found in petroleum are subject to CERCLA.
Used oil being disposed of may yet be listed as a hazardous waste. Such
used oil would then itself become a hazardous substance under CERCLA.
51 Fed. Reg. 41,904. Prior to making this determination, in a request for public com-
ments, EPA also stated: "even if used oil were not listed as a hazardous waste, but
contained hazardous substances at levels exceeding those normally found in petro-
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was consistent with EPA's determination m the 1985 Rulemaking that
used oil which has been contaminated with listed hazardous sub-
stances is not within the petroleum exclusion.73
In 1988, in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v EPA,74 the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the stigmatic
effect was an illegitimate criterion for determining not to list used oil
as a RCRA hazardous waste.75 The court ruled that EPA must use
technical criteria for determining whether to list used oil as a hazard-
ous waste.7 6 The HWTC decision forced EPA to reconsider its 1986
decision not to list used oil as a hazardous waste.
In 1992, EPA finally reached a determination on the status of used
oil.77 In May 1992, EPA issued final regulations78 under which oil des-
tined for disposal is not a listed hazardous waste. In September 1992,
EPA promulgated regulations79 under which used oil destined for re-
cycling also is not listed as a hazardous waste. The effect of the May
and September 1992 Rulemakings is to adopt the approach taken by
EPA in its 1986 decision. 0 In both of these rulemakings, EPA took
care to state that its decision was the result of its determination that
used oil managed in compliance with standards provided greater disin-
centives for the mismanagement of used oil."1 Thus, EPA has at-
tempted to provide a rationale for its rulemakings based on techical
criteria, rather than the illegitimate "stigmatic effect" criterion struck
down by the HWTC decision. 2
leum, the used oil would be (and currently is) subject to Superfund liability." Identifi-
cation and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8206 (1986 EPA notice of data
availability and request for comments).
73. See 50 Fed. Reg. 13,460.
74. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
[Hereinafter HWTC].
75. Id. at 277
76. Id.
77. In September 1991, EPA responded to the mandate of the HWTC court by
proposing three options for the regulation of used oil: (1) list all used oil as hazardous
waste; (2) list only that used oil which typically and frequently exhibits a hazardous
characteristic at the point of generation; and (3) do not list used oil as hazardous and
rely on management standards to prevent mishandling. Used Oil Management Sys-
tem and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,000, 48,019-21 (EPA notice of
proposed rulemakmg) (Sept. 23, 1991).
78. Management System for Used Oil Destined for Disposal, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,524
(1992) [hereinafter May 1992 Rulemaking].
79. Hazardous Waste Management System; Identification and Listing of Hazard-
ous Waste; Recycled Used Oil Management Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,566 (1992)
[hereinafter September 1992 Rulemaking].
80. See 51 Fed. Reg. 41,900, 41,901-02.
81. See 57 Fed. Reg. 21,524, 41,575.
82. In EPA's discussion of its decision not to list used oil destined for recycling as
a hazardous waste, EPA stated that it
wishes to reemphasize that its decision not to list recycled used oil as a haz-
ardous waste is based solely upon its evaluation of the techmcal listing crite-
ria contained in 40 CFR 261.11(a)(3). In particular, EPA has not taken into
1993]
18 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
Although the effect of the May and September 1992 Rulemakmgs is
that used oil cannot be a CERCLA hazardous substance, these
rulemakings do not mean that used oil cannot be a hazardous waste if
other conditions are present. On the contrary, in the May 1992
Rulemaking, EPA observed that used oil destined for disposal which
exhibits the characteristics of hazardous waste83 would itself be con-
sidered a hazardous waste.' As a hazardous waste, tis used oil
would be a CERCLA hazardous substance." In the September 1992
Rulemaking, EPA reiterated its prior conclusion that the petroleum
exclusion does not include hazardous substances which are added to
petroleum or increased in concentration as a result of contamina-
tion.86 Consequently, although EPA's decision not to list used oil as a
hazardous waste removes one means for concluding that used oil is
outside the petroleum exclusion, the agency's decision does not pre-
clude a determination that releases of used oil can result in CERCLA
liability.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF T PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
The judicial interpretations of the petroleum exclusion follow the
broad analytical framework established by EPA that uncontaminated
gasoline and other petroleum fuels are within the exclusion, but that
used oil and other petroleum products to which hazardous substances
have been added or increased in concentration are outside the exclu-
account the potential stigma associated with classifying used oil as hazardous
waste.
57 Fed. Reg. 41,576. However, environmental and industrial groups have challenged
EPA's determination, alleging that the Office of Management and Budget improperly
pressured EPA to classify recyclable used oil as non-hazardous waste. See Environ-
mentalists, Industry Continue Push for Court to Overturn Recyclable Used Oil Rule,
Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1540-41 (Oct. 9, 1992).
83. The characteristics of a hazardous waste are: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity
and toxicity. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.21-261.24 (1992).
84. In particular, the May 1992 Rulemaking provides that
[u]sed oils exhibiting one or more of the characteristics of hazardous waste
and which are destined for disposal continue to be regulated as hazardous
wastes. Mixtures of used oils and listed hazardous wastes are listed haz-
ardous wastes.
57 Fed. Reg. 21,528 (1992).
85. See 50 Fed. Reg. 49,267 (1985) (classification of used oil as a hazardous waste
would result in classification as a CERCLA hazardous substance).
86. The September 1992 Rulemakmg provides that
[t]he Agency has interpreted the petroleum exclusion to include crude oil
and fractions of crude oil, including hazardous substances that are indige-
nous in petroleum substances. However, hazardous substances that are ad-
ded to petroleum or that increase in concentration solely as a result of
contamination of the petroleum are not part of the petroleum and thus are
not excluded. Therefore, used oil that contains a hazardous substance due to
contamination is subject to CERCLA reporting, response, and liability
provisions.
57 Fed. Reg. 41,606 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Section 279).
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sion. The discussion below begins by reviewing the case law interpret-
mg the petroleum exclusion where the release has involved gasoline
or other fuels. The discussion then summarizes the case law interpret-
ing the petroleum exclusion where there is a release of used oil with
evidence of contamination by hazardous substances. This discussion
concludes by examining the split in the courts where there is no direct
evidence that used oil at a Superfund site was contaminated with haz-
ardous substances.
A. Gasoline And Other Fuels
In Wilshire Westwood Association v. Atlantic Richfield Corp.,s' the
Ninth Circuit held that the petroleum exclusion includes unrefined
and refined gasoline, even though certain components and additives in
gasoline have been designated as CERCLA hazardous substances. 88
The Wilshire court noted that a contrary interpretation of the petro-
leum exclusion would be incompatible with the plain meaning of the
statute and would render the exclusion a nullity.8 9 The court found
that the limited legislative history of CERCLA and post-CERCLA
legislative developments supported its interpretation of the petroleum
exclusion. 90 The court also noted that its decision was consistent with
EPA's interpretation of the petroleum exclusion.91 In following the
reasoning of Wilshire, a Michigan federal district court in Niecko v.
Emro Marketing CoY and a Florida federal district court in Bunger v.
Hartman93 found that the petroleum exclusion included contamnna-
tion from a gasoline station's leaking underground storage tanks. Wil-
shire, Niecko, and Bunger are consistent with an earlier decision by a
Pennsylvama federal district court which found that the petroleum ex-
clusion included a release of diesel fuel.94
87. 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989).
88. Id. at 810. In Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F Supp. 292,296-97 (C.D.
Cal. 1993), a California federal district court adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Wilshire m holding that the petroleum exclusion in California's "min-
Superfund" statute includes refined petroleum, such as gasoline.
89. Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 804.
90. Id. at 807-08.
91. Id. at 808.
92. 769 F Supp. 973, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1991), affd, 973 F.2d 1296 (6th Cir. 1992).
Another Michigan federal district decision followed the reasoning of Niecko in hold-
mg that leaking refined gasoline and other petroleum fuel from an underground stor-
age tank is within the petroleum exclusion. See Zoufal v. Amoco Oil Co., 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4920, at *9-*10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 1993).
93. 797 F Supp. 968, 972-73 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
94. See Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y v. Greyhound Corp., 31 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1079, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1990). In New York v. United States, 620 F Supp. 374,
386 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the court demed the defendants' summary judgment motion
with respect to plaintiffs CERCLA section 107(a) claim for a release of jet fuel. The
court found that a genuine factual dispute existed with respect to whether benzene,
toluene, and xylene were original constituents of the jet fuel or non-petroleum prod-
ucts. Id. Since the court did not hold that fuel was outside the petroleum exclusion,
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In reversing a district court decision which had held that "crude oil
tank bottoms" are within the petroleum exclusion, 95 the Ninth Circuit
in Cose v Getty Oil Co.96 clarified its holding in Wilshire. In Cose, the
Ninth Circuit deternmned that "crude oil tank bottoms" are not "pe-
troleum" or petroleum "fractions" because they consist of water and
sedimentary solids which accumulate at the bottom of storage tanks
without being exposed to the refining process. 7 The Ninth Circuit
noted that crude oil tank bottoms are not used for "producing useful
products" and, in view of CERCLA's overall purpose to clean-up haz-
ardous waste dump sites,98 concluded that the disposal of crude oil
tank bottoms "should not find protection under CERCLA's petro-
leum exclusion." 99 Cose suggests that the Ninth Circuit will limit the
scope of the petroleum exclusion to useful products, such as "natural
gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas or synthetic gas usable
for fuel" which are specifically enumerated in statutory language of
the exclusion.'00
B. Used Oil Contaminated With a Hazardous Substance
The Wilshire court did not consider whether the petroleum exclu-
sion included used oil or petroleum products that have been contami-
nated with hazardous substances during use.1 1 However, consistent
with EPA's 1985 Rulemaking and 1987 Memorandum, several courts
have found that the petroleum exclusion does not apply where used
the New York decision is not inconsistent with the subsequent decisions in Wilshire,
Niecko, and Bunger
95. Cose v. Getty Oil Co., 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1308 (E.D. Cal. 1991). The
district court characterized "crude oil tank bottoms" as "used oil," concluding that
"not all releases of used oil will be subject to CERCLA since used oil does not neces-
sarily contain non-indigenous hazardous substances or increased concentrations of
hazardous substances. Moreover, the impurities m used oil may not be CERCLA
hazardous substances." Id. at 1311-12. The district court found that, m the 1985
Rulemaking, EPA "interpreted 'waste oil' to include only unadulterated waste oil.
'Adulterated waste oil' is waste oil to which listed CERCLA substances have been
added." Id. at 1311 n.6. Thus, the district court created a presumption that used oil
does not contain hazardous substances in concentrations greater than those inherent
in oil prior to usage. See nfra notes 111-19 and accompanying text (reviewing cases
holding that used oil is within the petroleum exclusion). Under this reasoning, there
must be direct evidence of contamination by a hazardous substance before CERCLA
liability attaches to the release of used oil. Finding that the site at which the crude oil
tank bottoms had been disposed did not contain hazardous substances in concentra-
tions greater than those indigenous to petroleum, the district court held that CER-
CLA liability did not attach because of the petroleum exclusion. Cose, 34 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 1312.
96. No. 91-16575, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20,399 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 1993).
97 Id. at *13.
98. Id. at *18 (citing 1987 EPA Memorandum, supra note 62).
99. Id. at *18-*19.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988) (providing for the petroleum exclusion to the
definition of "hazardous substance").
101. Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 805 n.5.
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oil has been mixed with a listed hazardous substance or where there is
evidence that the concentration of hazardous substances in used oil
increased as a result of contamination during use. For example, in
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., °2 the Southern District of New
York held that the petroleum exclusion does not apply to waste oil
emulsion containing concentrations of lead, chromium, and cadmium
which increased during the industrial process.' 03 In a similar decision,
the court in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.1 '4 held that the
petroleum exclusion does not apply to oil emulsion that has become
contaminated with chromium, copper, lead, and zinc.'0 5
In denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court
in Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bank 06 held that waste oil con-
tainig elevated levels of zinc, lead, and thallium was not within the
petroleum exclusion. 0 7 Similarly, in United States v. Western Process-
ing Co., Inc.,'08 the court demed the defendant's summary judgment
motion where the plaintiff had presented evidence that tank bottom
waste sludges contained elevated levels of lead, chromium, and
nickel.109 These decisions are consistent with an earlier decision by a
Pennsylvania federal district court denying a defendant's motion for
summary judgment against a CERCLA plaintiff where the plaintiff
presented evidence of hazardous substances in the defendant's
waste.1 0
102. 766 F Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
103. Id. at 188.
104. 755 F Supp. 531, 539 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993).
105. Id. at 539. In a similar case in the Third Circuit, the court vacated the district
court's decision, but agreed with the district court that the petroleum exclusion did
not apply to the defendant's waste where the defendant admitted that hazardous sub-
stances were added to waste oil emulsion. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
964 F.2d 252, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1992).
106. 764 F Supp. 1377, 1385 (E.D. Cal. 1991). The court distinguished its demal of
summary judgment regarding the lead content of the waste oil because the source of
the lead was a question of fact. The court stated that if the lead level exceeded the
amount that would have occurred m petroleum during the refining process, then the
petroleum exclusion would not apply.
107. Id. at 1385.
108. 761 F Supp. 713, 715-17, 724 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
109. Id. at 719-20.
110. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., No. 81-0851, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14,219, at *8-*9 (E.D. Pa. December 19, 1988) (defendant's summary judg-
ment motion demed where plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact with re-
spect to the composition of defendant's waste). A recent unreported case from a
Michigan federal district court also found that waste oil contaminated with hazardous
substances is outside the petroleum exclusion. See Lockhart Chem. Co. v. Moreco
Energy, Inc., No. 89-CV-40160-FL, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19,404 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 5,
1992) (granting summary judgment to plaintiff where waste oil was contaminated with
trichloroethylene and 1,1,1 - trichloroethane).
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C. Used Oil Without Direct Evidence of the Composition
of the Oil
There is a split in the courts when there is no direct evidence that
used oil was contaminated with hazardous substances. The discussion
below first reviews the case law holding that used oil is within the
petroleum exclusion where there is no direct evidence pertaimng to
the contaminants in the used oil. These courts, in effect, have created
a presumption that used oil is not contaminated with hazardous sub-
stances. The discussion then considers the case law which has found
that used oil is outside the petroleum exclusion, even where there is
no direct evidence on the identity of contaminants in the oil. These
decisions have created a presumption that used oil is contaminated
with hazardous substances.
1. Within the Scope of the Petroleum Exclusion
Where there is no evidence of the presence of a hazardous sub-
stance in used oil, four courts have concluded that used oil is within
the petroleum exclusion. In Marmon Group, Inc. v. Rexnord, Inc.,"'
an Illinois federal district court referred to the dictionary definition of
"cutting oil" m holding that "waste cutting oil" is within the petroleum
exclusion. 112 The Marmon court reasoned that, since cutting oil as a
form of oil is excluded from the definition of hazardous substance,
"waste cutting oil" is also within the petroleum exclusion."13
The Marmon court did not distinguish "waste cutting oil" from
"cutting oil," nor did it examine the legislative history or EPA's inter-
pretation of the petroleum exclusion. In reversing the case on other
grounds, the Seventh Circuit observed that the "district court dis-
missed the CERCLA count on the ground that the 'cutting oil' was
not a substance regulated by CERCLA."" 4 Consequently, both the
district court and the Seventh Circuit failed to recognize any distmc-
tion between "waste cutting oil" and "cutting oil." Similarly, m
Niecko the court asserted that the "spill" involved was "nothing more
nor less than leaking gasoline.""' 5 However, the Niecko court also
noted that the underground storage tanks on the property contained
"waste oil," thus suggesting that the petroleum exclusion includes
"waste oil1 116
111. No. 85 C7838, 1986 WL 7070 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 1986), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 822 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at *6.
113. In particular, the Marmon court determined that: "waste cutting oil is a form
of oil; it is 'an oil or oily preparation used as a cutting fluid.' As a form of oil or
petroleum, cutting oil is specifically excluded from CERCLA m section 9601(4)'s [sic]
definition of the term 'hazardous substance."' Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICroNARY 562).
114. Marmon, 822 F.2d at 33.
115. Niecko, 769 F Supp. at 982.
116. In particular, the Niecko court observed that: "According to the Plaintiff
[the Defendant] never disclosed to him that there were previously underground
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In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. California Department of
Transportation,117 the Central District of California referred to EPA's
1981 Policy Statement and 1987 Memorandum in concluding that used
petroleum products mxed with soil are within the petroleum exclu-
sion."" The Southern Pacific court noted, however, that EPA has de-
termined "that hazardous substances which are added to petroleum or
which increase in concentration solely as a result of contamination
during use are not part of 'petroleum' and thus are not excluded from
CERCLA."' 1 9 As with Marmon and Niecko, the Southern Pacific
court implicitly recognized a presumption that used oil does not con-
tain non-indigenous hazardous substances.
2. Outside the Petroleum Exclusion
Two courts have effectively created a rebuttable presumption that
used oil is contaminated with non-mdigenous hazardous substances,
such that releases of used oil are outside the petroleum exclusion.
The first of these decisions is the ruling by the Southern District of
New York in City of New York v. Exxon Corp.'20 As previously dis-
cussed,' 21 the Exxon court found that oil emulsion containing concen-
trations of lead, chromium, and cadmium which increased during the
industrial process was outside the petroleum exclusion. 22 However,
the Exxon court also stated that "[b]y its plain language, this exclusion
for petroleum does not include waste oil.""' Thus, the Exxon court
presumed that CERCLA liability attaches to releases of used oil.
In the other decision, the court in United States v Western Process-
ing Co. 24 held that sludge from petroleum storage tanks was not
within the petroleum exclusion.'2 Although the Western Processing
plaintiff did not have information about the precise chemical composi-
storage tanks on the property which contained gasoline and waste oil. [The Defend-
ant] further failed to disclose that the storage tanks sat unused with gasoline and oil in
them. " Id. at 976 (emphasis added).
117. 790 F Supp. 983 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
118. In particular, the Southern Pacific court observed that
[T]he EPA has consistently maintained that used petroleum products are
covered by the petroleum exclusion. In 1981, for example, the EPA deter-
mined that "petroleum wastes, including waste oil are excluded from the
definition of 'hazardous substance' by the specific language of [CERCLA]."
(citation omitted) This determination was reiterated by the EPA in 1987"
"[N]o petroleum substance, including used oil can be a 'hazardous sub-
stance' except to the extent that it is listed as a hazardous waste.
Id. at 985-86.
119. Id. at 986 (quoting Scope of the CERCLA Exclusion Under Sections 101(14)
and 104(a)(2), EPA Gen. Counsel Memo, July 31, 1987, at 5).
120. 766 F Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
121. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
122. Exxon, 766 F Supp. at 188.
123. Id. at 186.
124. 761 F Supp. 713 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
125. Id. at 724.
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tion of the defendant's sludge, it used two approaches to address the
burden-of-proof issue. First, the plaintiff presented evidence that the
defendant's steel tanks which held the sludge prior to disposal at the
plaintiff's facility likely contained additives of chromium and nickel,126
which are listed hazardous substances. 127 The plaintiff contended that
the scale which developed on the interior walls of the steel tanks and
became part of the sludge likely contained oxides of chromium and
mckel from constituents in the steel tanks.128 The plaintiff asserted
that the, precise constituents of the tanks were peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendant and that the defendant should have the
burden of identifying these constituents. 29 After the defendant failed
to present evidence on the constituents in the steel tanks,130 the West-
ern Processing court agreed with the plaintiff and found that the pe-
troleum exclusion did not apply, observing that the defendant,
although in the best position to provide the information on the precise
composition of its steel tanks, had not done so.' 31
The plaintiff's second approach in Western Processing was to assert
that there is a presumption that the defendant's tanks contained haz-
ardous substances. 32 To support this assertion, the plaintiff used as
evidence a 1990 internal memorandum 33 from an EPA regional office
which discusses the toxicity of materials m underground storage
tanks. 34 The 1990 Memorandum states that waste m underground
storage tanks is presumed to be hazardous waste, unless the waste is
tested to determine that it does not exhibit a characteristic of a haz-
ardous waste.135 The plaintiff further contended that waste from un-
derground storage tanks is indistinguishable from waste m above-
ground storage tanks, such as the defendant's, for purposes of deter-
mining whether hazardous substances are present. 36 The Western
126. Id. at 717, 720.
127 See List of Hazardous Substances and Reportable Quantities, 40 C.F.R.
§ 302.4 (1992).
128. Id.
129. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that "[ilt is well settled that m the interest of
fairness the burden of proof ordinarily resting upon one party as to a disputed issue
may shift to his adversary when the true facts relating to the disputed issue lie pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the latter." Western Processing, 761 F. Supp. at 720
(quoting United States v. Hayes, 369 F.2d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1966)).
130. Id. at 720.
131. Id. at 723.
132. Id. at 720.
133. Memorandum from Chet McLaughlin, EPA Region VII Office, to John Hef-
felfinger & Steve Cochran, EPA Region VII Office (Dec. 13, 1990) [hereinafter 1990
Memorandum].
134. Western Processing, 761 F Supp. at 720.
135. The 1990 Memorandum states: "wastes from the interior of the tank [which]
include unrecovered product, water, sludge, scale, etc., are presumed to be hazard-
ous. The only method to remove the presumption is to test the waste for the
characteristics of a hazardous waste." 1990 Memorandum, supra note 133, at 2.
136. Western Processing, 761 F Supp. at 720.
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Processing court agreed with this argument, 37 thus establishing a pre-
sumption that the petroleum exclusion does not apply.'
38
IV. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF THE PETROLEUM EXCLUSION
In standard statutory analysis, one or more of the following fadtors
are typically used to determine the meaning of a statute: (1) the plain
meaning of the statutory language, 39 (2) the legislative history,"4 and
(3) the underlying objectives of the statute. 4' The discussion below
demonstrates that consideration of the first two factors supports the
conclusions of the EPA and courts that uncontaminated gasoline and
other fuels are within the scope of the petroleum exclusion, but that
used oil and other petroleum products to which hazardous substances
have been added are outside the exclusion. This discussion will also
demonstrate that these two factors do not provide guidance in deter-
mining whether used oil should be within the petroleum exclusion
137 Id. at 724. In particular, the Western Processing court found that
[t]he toxicity of the sludge being key, there is no rational basis for distin-
guishing underground from above-ground tanks. While underground tanks
may have the additional problem of corrosion from outside, the focus of the
memorandum is, nevertheless, on the toxicity of the sludge, and that has
been the focus of the analysis m this case. It is the attachment to the [1990
Memorandum] that stated the presumption that the tank wastes were haz-
ardous and that the only way to remove the presumption was by testing the
waste. The information provided with the [1990 Memorandum] was of
assistance in construing the meamng of the petroleum exclusion.
Id.
138. Western Processing is distinguishable from the Ninth Circuit's decision m Cose
m that Western Processing involved tank bottom material contaminated by sand and
rust from the sides of storage tanks, whereas in Cose the plaintiffs did not allege that
contaminants had been added to the bottoms. See Cose, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
20,399, at *14 n.5. Thus, Cose is broader than Western Processing m that it concluded
that tank bottoms were not within the meaning of "petroleum" and, hence, not within
the petroleum exclusion. By contrast, Western Processing found that tank bottoms
were "petroleum," but not within the petroleum exclusion because of the presump-
tion that CERCLA hazardous substances had been added to the bottoms. Western
Processing, 761 F Supp. at 724.
139. See Cammetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917) ("Where the language
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not
arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meaning need no discussion.") (citing
Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899)).
140. While courts first look to the language of the text to interpret a statute, courts
invariably refer to the legislative history to confirm the plain meamng of the words of
the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 561 (1982) ("[a]lthough the
language of the statute is clear, any lingering doubt as to its proper construction may
be resolved by examining the legislative history of the statute"); Griffin v. Oceamc
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982) (the legislative history "confirms that Con-
gress intended the statute to mean exactly what its plain language says").
141. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("[ilt is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose"). However, statutory interpretation is not "an opportunity
for a judge to use words as 'empty vessels into which he can pour anything he
will' " See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
CoLuM. L. RPv. 527, 529 (1947).
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when no direct evidence exists regarding the identity of the contami-
nants in the oil. In the next section, this Article uses the third factor
- the objectives of CERCLA - in conjunction with general princi-
ples of civil litigation to demonstrate the appropriateness of creating a
rebuttable presumption that used oil is contaminated with a hazardous
substance so that CERCLA liability attaches.
A. Plain Meaning of the Statute
In analyzing the scope of the petroleum exclusion, the Ninth Circuit
in Wilshire noted that "[t]he plain language of a statute is the starting
point for its interpretation.""14 As previously noted, CERCLA's ex-
clusion for petroleum provides that:
[t]he term [hazardous substance] does not include petroleum, in-
cluding crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise spe-
cifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance . and the
term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natu-
ral gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas
and such synthetic gas).143
However, CERCLA does not define the terms "petroleum," "crude
oil, .... fraction" or "natural gas." 1" Where possible, words of a statute
should be interpreted according to their ordinary meanmg1 45 A stan-
dard dictionary defines "petroleum" as
an oily flammable bituminous liquid that is a complex mixture of
hydrocarbons with small amounts of other substances, and is pre-
pared for use as fgasoline, naphtha, or other products by vanous re-
fining processes.
This definition is consistent with the definition for "petroleum" in a
standard chemical dictionary. 47 In defining "petroleum," a standard
chemical dictionary identifies "petroleum fractions" as substances de-
rived by distilling crude oil such as gasoline, hydrocarbon gases, naph-
tha, kerosene, fuel oils, gas oil, lubricating oils, paraffin wax, and
asphalt. 4 Thus, the plain meaning of the statutory language supports
142. 881 F.2d at 803 (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68
(1982)).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
144. Bailer, supra note 43, at 918; Cose, 34 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1311.
145. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966).
146. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 880 (1985); see 1987 Mem-
orandum, supra note 62, at 6-7 (quoting the definition of "petroleum" In WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEw COLLEGiATE DICVIONARY).
147. HAWLEY'S CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICTIONARY 540 (11th ed. 1987) [herein-
after HAWLEY'S].
148. Id. at 892; see Exxon, 766 F Supp. at 186 (referencing HAWLEY'S in concluding
that waste oil is not within the petroleum exclusion); Western Processing, 761 F Supp.
at 719 (citing HAWLEY'S in finding that used oil is not within the petroleum
exclusion).
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the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Wilshire that gasoline is within
the petroleum exclusion.'4 9
As noted by the Wilshire court, if the petroleum exclusion did not
include gasoline, the exclusion would be rendered a virtual nullity,150
since almost every petroleum spill or leak would be actionable under
CERCLA.Y51 The plain meaning of the statute also supports the de-
termination by EPA and the courts that used oil, solvents, and other
petroleum products to which listed hazardous substances have been
added or increased in concentration during use are outside the petro-
leum exclusion. A contrary reading of the statute would provide an
enormous loophole from CERCLA liability for PRPs responsible for
releases of mixtures of hazardous substances and oil or gasoline.
Under such a reading, the mere addition of oil or gasoline to a hazard-
ous substance would render the mixture immune from CERCLA lia-
bility. This reading of the statute would eviscerate CERCLA.5 2
Nevertheless, the plain meaning of the statute does not provide gui-
dance on whether a presumption should exist that used oil is contan-
nated with a hazardous substance so that CERCLA liability attaches.
Although CERCLA does not define the term "used oil," the Used Oil
Recycling Act defines it to mean "any oil which has been - (A) re-
fined from crude oil, (B) used, and (C) as a result of such use, contam-
mated by physical or chemical impurities." 'i However, this
defintion does not provide any assistance on whether the "physical or
chemical impunties" in used oil are presumed to be hazardous
substances.
The courts which have used the plain meaning of the statutory lan-
guage to allocate the burden of proving the identity of impurities in
used oil have been disingenuous. In particular, the Marmon court
concluded that "waste cutting oil" is within the petroleum exclusion
149. 881 F.2d at 804.
150. IdL
151. Id. at 805 n.5.
152. See Marsano v. Laird, 412 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1969)("[A]n interpretation
which emasculates a provision of a statute is not to be preferred. ").
153. RCRA § 1004(36) (1988). In 1990, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act
(OPA) to provide a mechanism for cleaning up discharges of oil. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61
(1990). Among other things, OPA makes a "responsible party" liable for "removal
costs" incurred by any person m response to the responsible party's discharge of "oil"
into "navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-(b) (1990). OPA defines the term "oil"
to mean: "[A]ny kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil
refuse but does not include petroleum which is specifically listed or designated
as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of [CERCLA].. ."
33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (1990). The House Conference Report that accompamed the
legislation that became OPA explained that this definition for oil "ensures that there
wiU be no overlap um the liability provisions of CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act."
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,780. Thus, OPA does not address CERCLA's petroleum exclusion
and does not provide insight into the scope of the exclusion except perhaps to rein-
force that unused oil products are not within the exclusion.
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on the basis of the dictionary definition of "cutting oil."'" 4 However,
the court ignored the modifier "waste" and any hazardous substances
which may have been present in this "waste." In reaching a contrary
result, the Southern District of New York in Exxon boldly stated that
"[b]y its plain language, this exclusion for petroleum does not include
waste oil."'"5 However, the court did not provide guidance on how
the plain meaning of the statute results in a presumption that contami-
nants in "waste oil" include hazardous substances. Consequently, the
allocation of the burden of proof regarding contaminants must be as-
certamed from going beyond the plain meaning of the statute.
B. Legislative History
There is little legislative history' 56 associated with the enactment of
CERCLA,1' 7 and almost none which addresses the scope of the petro-
leum exclusion.' 58 This limited legislative history of CERCLA pro-
vides guidance only in interpreting the broad parameters of the
154. Marmon, No. 85 C 7838, 1986 WL 7070 at *2.
155. Exxon, 766 F Supp. at 186.
156. Although legislative history is frequently used to determine the intent of Con-
gress in enacting legislation, many courts and commentators have expressed reserva-
tions about using the legislative history as a device for statutory interpretation. See,
e.g., Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the
details, as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report
come to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts the
committee's bill.") (footnote omitted);
In general, little legislative history is helpfully relevant. Much of it is unreli-
able or unreliably revealed. Most if not all of it is of questionable practical
availability to typical members of the legislative audience. Besides, little or
none of it is relied on by typical members of the legislative audience as con-
ditioning the language of the statute.
Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1983).
The primary concern with using the legislative history as an interpretive device is
that it may be manipulated to lead courts to construe a statute in a way that contra-
venes the plain meanmg of statutory language.
The fact of the matter is that legislative history can be cited to support al-
most any proposition, and frequently is. The propensity of judges to look
past the statutory language is well known to legislators. It creates strong
incentives for manipulating legislative history to achieve through the courts
results not achievable during the enactment process.
Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. Grad, supra note 2, at 1.
158. In Wilshire, the Ninth Circuit observed that
IT]here is virtually no legislative history contemporaneous with the enact-
ment of CERCLA directly relevant to the scope of the petroleum exclusion.
This dearth is probably because CERCLA was enacted as a compromise
among three competing bills, H.R. 7020, H.R. 85, and S. 1480, after very
limited debate under a suspension of the rules. . Of these three bills, only
H.R. 85 addressed oil spills. H.R. 85 was reported to the Senate but no
further action was taken on it.
881 F.2d at 805-06 (citations omitted).
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petroleum exclusion, and does not aid in determining the allocation of
the burden of proving whether used oil is contaminated with hazard-
ous substances. 59
CERCLA was the product of a compromise among three compet-
ing bills: House Bill 7020, House Bill 85, and Senate Bill 1480.1' Of
these three bills, only House Bill 85 provided for compensation for oil
spills.16' House Bill 85 passed the House and was reported to the Sen-
ate where it died. 62 Ultimately, it was the language of an amended
Senate Bill 1480 that became the basis for the bill enacted as CER-
CLA. 63 The discussion of the petroleum exclusion in the Senate re-
port' 64 which accompanied Senate Bill 1480 mirrors the statutory
language providing for the petroleum exclusion and sheds little insight
into the actual scope of the exclusion, except to reaffirm that "oil" is
within the exclusion.165
159. The traditional rule of statutory interpretation is that the legislative history
should only be considered if the language of the statute is ambiguous. See WnruiAm
N. ESKRDGE & PmrLn P FRicKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 616-88
(1988). In light of CERCLA's failure to define the term "petroleum" and the lack of
clarity associated with the plain meaning of the statutory language establishing the
petroleum exclusion, it is appropriate to consider the legislative history in determin-
ing the meaning of the exclusion. Contra Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 810 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) ("I agree with the substance of the court's treatment of CERCLA'S [sic]
legislative history. and write separately only to emphasize that we need not go
beyond the language of the statute itself in order to reach our result. In my view, the
language of CERCLA'S [sic] 'petroleum exclusion', plainly applies to gasoline,
even when, as here, that gasoline contains lead additives.").
160. See supra, note 158. The Superfund bill originally advanced by President
Carter's administration, S. 1341, died in Senate Committee. See 1 HELEN COHN
NEEDHAM & MARK MENEFEE, SuPER.FuND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY xii (1983)
[hereinafter SUPERFUND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
161. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 805-06; SUPERFUND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 160, at xiv.
162. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 805-06; SUPERFUND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 160, at xiv-xv.
163. See Grad, supra note 2, at 29-30 (noting that, although the Superfund legisla-
tion was formally treated as a measure originating in the House, the language of S.
1480 was inserted for the language of H.R. 7020 and approved by both the Senate and
the House); see also SuPERuND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 160, at xxi (not-
Ing that when the Senate considered H.R. 7020, it inserted the language of the
amended S. 1480).
164. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1980), reprinted in SuPERFUND LEG-
ISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 160, at 12-13.
165. In particular, the Senate Report stated that
petroleum, including crude oil and including fractions of crude oil which are
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of the definition, is excluded from the
definition of a hazardous substance. The reported bill does not cover spills
or other releases strictly of oil. It is also important to note that natural gas,
liquefied natural gas (LNG), and high BTU synthetic gas of pipeline quality
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas) are not considered haz-
ardous substances within the purposes of S. 1480.
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The floor debate during consideration of Senate Bill 1480 reflects
congressional intent for CERCLA liability to attach to releases of
mixtures of oil and hazardous substances. 66 There is additional sup-
port in the floor debate for concluding that Congress intended CER-
CLA liability to attach to releases of petroleui products containing
additives of hazardous substances, such as polychlormated biphenyls
(PCBs)167 and dioxin.168 The floor debate also indicates that Congress
intended releases of strictly oil to be within the petroleum exclu-
sion.169 However, as with the plain language of the statute and the
committee report which accompamed Senate Bill 1480, the floor de-
bate does not provide guidance in determining whether Congress in-
tended to create a presumption that used oil is contaminated with
hazardous substances.
The post-CERCLA legislative history also does not provide assist-
ance in determining the allocation of the burden of proving that used
166. Supporting the conclusion that the petroleum exclusion does not cover oil con-
tammated with hazardous substances, Representative Edgar made the following
statement during the House consideration of CERCLA.
[H]azardous substances problems have been discovered at an alarming rate
m recent years. In the summer of 1979, an oil slick appeared on the Susque-
hanna River near Pittston, Pa. When EPA officials responded they
learned that the slick contained a variety of highly poisonous chemicals in
addition to the oil.
Officials estimate that more than 300,000 gallons of acids, cyanide com-
pounds, industrial solvents, waste oil and other chemicals remain at this
site.
126 CONG. REc. H11,798 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Edgar), reprinted
in SUPERFUND LEGISLATrVE HIsTORY, supra note 162, at 179; see 1987 Memorandum,
supra note 62, at 9 (quoting statement of Rep. Edgar).
167. See 126 CONG. Rnc. 30,931 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (discussing
PCB-contammated transformer fluids), reprinted in SuPERFuND LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 162, at 259; 126 CONG. REc. 30,942 (1980) (statement of Sen. Mitch-
ell) (discussing PCB-contammated waste oil), reprinted In SUPERFUND LEGIsLATWE
HISTORY, supra note 162, at 270.
168. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,942 (1980) (statement of Sen. Mitchell), reprinted in
SUPERFUND LEGISLATrVE HISTORY, supra note 162, at 270.
169. Supporting the conclusion that the purpose of the petroleum exclusion was to
exclude releases of "oil" from CERCLA liability is the following comment made by
Representative Mikuiski during consideration of CERCLA.
[I]t is disappointing to see no oil-related provisions in the bill, but we must
also realize that this is our only chance to get hazardous waste dump site
cleanup legislation enacted.
Moreover, there is already a mechanism in place that is designed to deal
with spills in navigable waterways. There is not however, any provision cur-
rently in our law that addresses the potentially ruinous situation of aban-
doned toxic dump sites. I, therefore, believe that it is imperative that we
pass the Senate bill as a very important beginning m our attempt to defuse
the ticking environmental time bomb of abandoned tome waste sites.
Id. at 178; see 1987 Memorandum, supra note 62, at 8 (quoting statement of Rep.
Mikulski).
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oil is contaminated with a hazardous substance. 170 During the
reauthorization of RCRA in 1984,'7' Congress adopted a manage-
ment program for underground storage tanks, including those contain-
ing hazardous substances and petroleum, 72 but declined to amend
CERCLA's petroleum exclusion.173 While there is language in the
legislative history of the 1984 RCRA amendment to suggest that Con-
gress intended gasoline and other fuels to be within CERCLA's petro-
leum exclusion, 74 there is no discussion addressing the more difficult
burden-of-proof issues associated with the petroleum exclusion.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), 75 which significantly revised CER-
CLA, but did not alter the language of the petroleum exclusion.
SARA added to CERCLA a definition for the term "pollutant or con-
tammant"'176 and included in this definition an exclusion for petro-
leum identical to the petroleum exclusion contained in the defimtion
of "hazardous substance.' 7 7 However, this statutory language does
170. See Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 806-08, which used the legislative history of RCRA
and SARA to interpret the petroleum exclusion, although noting the Supreme
Court's admonition m Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983), that "the
views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
earlier one."
171. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98
Stat. 3221 (codified m scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
172. The section of the 1984 RCRA amendments which provides for the regulation
of underground storage tanks defines the term "regulated substance" to mean "(A)
any substance defined in section 9601(14) of this title (but not including any substance
regulated as a hazardous waste ), and (B) petroleum." RCRA § 9001(2) (1988).
Thus, hazardous substances, other than RCRA hazardous wastes, are regulated by the
underground storage tank provisions. The 1984 RCRA amendments also define the
term "petroleum" to mean "petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof
which is liquid at standard conditions of temperature and pressure (60 degrees Fahr-
enheit and 14.7 pounds per square inch absolute)." Id.
173. During the reauthorization of RCRA, Senator Durenberger, the Senate spon-
sor of the 1984 RCRA amendments stated that:
[u]nderground storage tanks are seldom regulated. At present, Federal reg-
ulation of storage tanks covers only above-ground tanks containing chemical
wastes. And, if a tank is leaking, the Federal government cannot under
Superfund authority respond or clean up a spill if it involves petroleum
products . . The tank storage of one of the most common under-
groundwater contaminants - gasoline - is unregulated because it is not a
waste product (and thus not under the authority of [RCRA]), and spills of
the fuel cannot be cleaned up under the Superfund law because it is a petro-
leum product.
130 CONG. REc. S2028, 52080 (daily ed. Feb 29, 1984)(statement of Sen.
Durenberger). See Bailer, supra note 43, at 919 (discussing the impact of reauthonza-
tion of the RCRA on the petroleum exclusion; Wilshire, 881 F.2d at 806-07.
174. 130 CONG. REc. S2028, S2080 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1984)(statement of Sen.
Durenberger).
175. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and Titles
10, 26, 29, 33, and 42 U.S.C.).
176. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33) (1988) (defining "pollutant or contaminant").
177. In particular, the term "pollutant or contammant" does not include:
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not provide additional insight into the scope of the petroleum
exclusion.
SARA's legislative history is of lirmted assistance in determining
the scope of the petroleum exclusion. The conference report that ac-
companied H.R. 2005,178 the legislation which became SARA, dis-
cusses the term "petroleum" in connection with the petroleum
response fund under RCRA for leaking underground storage tanks.
This conference report explains that the fund covers tanks containing
used oil contaminated with hazardous substances, in addition to tanks
containing uncontaminated petroleum.17 9 As noted by EPA, this is
not inconsistent with the conclusion that CERCLA liability attaches
to releases of used oil contaminated with hazardous substances.180 In-
deed, floor statements by members of Congress during consideration
of SARA reflect an understanding that CERCLA liability could at-
tach to releases of used oil.181 However, this legislative history does
not suggest a method for proving whether used oil is contaminated
with a hazardous substance. 82
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subpara-
graphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (14) [of 42 U.S.C. § 9601] and shall not
include natural gas, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas of pipeline quality
(or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(33) (1988).
178. H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1986).
179. Id
180. 1987 Memorandum, supra note 62, at 11.
181. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S14,928 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen.
Chaffee) (noting that nothing m SARA § 114 relating to liability for releases of re-
cycled oil "shall affect or impair the authority of the President to take a response
action pursuant to § 104 or 106 of CERCLA with respect to any release of used oil
or recycled oil"); 132 CONG. Ruc. H9611 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Schneider) (noting that contaminated waste oil has been identified at 153 Superfund
sites).
In Cose, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20,399, at *23-*24, the Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendants' assertion that a statement by Senator Simpson during the 1986 considera-
tion of SARA supported the inclusion of "crude oil tank bottoms" within the scope of
the petroleum exclusion. See 132 CONG. REc. S14,931-32 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)
(statement of Sen. Simpson). The Cose court concluded that "[p]ost-enactment legis-
lative history merits less weight than contemporaneous legislative history. Senator
Simpson's stray comment was made six years after the enactment of CERCLA's pe-
troleum exclusion, which remains unaltered to this date. Hence, we confer little, if
any, weight to the comment." Id. at *24 (citation omitted).
182. In 1990, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), Pub. L. No.
101-380, 104 Stat. 486 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. III 1991)), to provide a
mechanism for cleaning up discharges of oil. Among other things, OPA makes a "re-
sponsible party" liable for "removal costs" incurred by any person in response to the
responsible party's discharge of "oil" into "navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)-
(b). OPA defines the term "oil" to mean "oil of any kind or m any form, including
petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, but does not include petroleum. which is
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under [CERCLA
§ 101(14)(A)-(F)]." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(23). OPA does not address CERCLA's petro-
leum exclusion, but the House Conference Report that accompanied the legislation
that became OPA explains that tins definition for oil "ensures that there will be no
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V. CREATING A PRESUMPTION THAT USED OIL IS CONTAMINATED
WITH A HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE
A challenging issue arises when there exists evidence of contamina-
tion by hazardous substances at a Superfund site at which used oil was
managed, but no direct evidence that the used oil was contaminated
with hazardous substances. That is, should CERCLA liability attach
to those PRPs who would otherwise be liable, but for the lack of evi-
dence identifying the contaminants in the used oil as hazardous sub-
stances? Because the question has not been addressed within either
the plain meaning or the legal history of CERCLA, the discussion be-
low uses traditional principles of civil litigation to demonstrate that a
rebuttable presumption should exist that used oil is contaminated with
a hazardous substance. The result of this presumption is that CER-
CLA liability would attach to releases of used oil, unless a PRP could
demonstrate that the used oil was not contaminated with hazardous
substances.
A. The Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Before discussing the appropriateness of creating a presumption
that used oil is contaminated with a hazardous substance, it is first
necessary to review the general principles for allocating the burden of
proof in civil litigation. The term "burden of proof' consists of two
distinct burdens. 83 One burden is that of producing evidence to
demonstrate that a particular fact is in issue.'8 4 If the party with the
burden of producing evidence does not meet this burden, it should
receive an adverse ruling."8 5 The second burden is the "burden of per-
suading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true."' 8 6
The burden of production may shift from party to party.18 7 Under
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the burden of persuasion
remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast. 88 In most cases, the party with the burden of pleading a fact will
have the burdens of producing evidence and of persuading the trier of
overlap m the liability provisions of CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act." H.R. REP.
No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 780. Thus,
OPA does not provide insight into the scope of CERCLA's petroleum exclusion.
183. GRAHAM LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3.1, at 48
n.2 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LAW OF EVIDENCE]; EDWARD W CLEARY, MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 947 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCoRMICK]; Flemming
James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv 51 (1961) [hereinafter Burdens of Proof];
Edward W Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1959) [hereinafter Presuming and Pleading].
184. McCoRMICK, supra note 183, § 336, at 947; Burdens of Proof, supra note 183,
at 51; Presuming and Pleading, supra note 183, at 15-16.
185. MCCORMICK, supra note 183, § 336, at 947.
186. Id., See also Burdens of Proof, supra note 183, at 51; Presuming and Pleading,
supra note 183, at 15-16.
187. McCoRMICK, supra note 183, § 336, at 947.
188. Id.
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fact of the existence of the proposition in question.189 In most civil
cases, the party who has the burden of persuasion of a fact must prove
that fact by a preponderance of evidence. 19°
A presumption is a device for allocating the burden of proof be-
tween litigants.' 9 ' A presumption can be viewed as an inference of
one fact from the existence of another.'91 In 1988, the Supreme Court
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,193 observed that
[p]resumptions typically serve to assist courts in managing circum-
stances m wich direct proof, for one reason or another, is rendered
difficult. . Arising out of considerations of fairness, public policy,
and probability, as well as judicial economy, presumptions are also
useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between
parties. 94
The factors identified by the Basic court for creating a presumption
- difficulty in obtaining direct proof, fairness, public policy, and
probability - are widely recognized by the courts and other authori-
ties as grounds for creating a presumption. 95
A presumption generally shifts only the burden of production. 96 In
these situations, the presumption disappears upon introduction of evi-
189. Id. § 337, at 948.
190. Id. § 339, at 956; Burdens of Proof, supra note 183, at 53.
191. Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1066 (4th Cir. 1988).
192. Burdens of Proof, supra note 183, at 63; see Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Higgins,
150 F.2d 536, 538 n.2 (2d Cir. 1945).
193. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
194. Id. at 245 (citations omitted). After considering these factors, the Basic court
upheld a presumption that the securities market relies on publicly available informa-
tion, including misrepresentations. Id. at 245-46; see Howmg Co. v. Nationwide
Corp., 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991) (following the reasoning of Basic in denying a
defendant's summary judgment motion where there was a presumption that mforma-
tion not disclosed by defendant corporation was material).
195. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 183, § 343, at 968-73; Presuming and Pleading,
supra note 183, at 11-14; 1 D. LOUiSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 68, at
541-42 (1977) [hereinafter FEDERAL EViDENCE]. See e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v.
Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (court considered probability,
fairness and policy factors in allocating the burden of proof) (citations omitted).
196. See, e.g., Keeler Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065-66
(4th Cir. 1988). In Keeler the court found that the plaintiff had established a presump-
tion of copyright infringement, but concluded that the plaintiff retained the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the proposition was true:
[r]egardless of these proof schemes, the burden of persuasion normally re-
mains on the plaintiff for his claim throughout the trial. In the usual civil
case, therefore, the plaintiff has the burden to persuade the trier of fact that
the existence of the proposition to be proved is more probably true than not
true.
Id. at 1066; see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56
(1980) (establishment of a prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful discnm-
mation, but the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion); Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747,
751 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing a presumption in favor of an established domicile
against a newly created one, but observing that this presumption only shifted the bur-
den of production and did not shift the burden of persuasion).
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dence sufficient to sustain a finding of nonexistence of the presumed
fact.197 In other situations, courts have determined that a presump-
tion also shifts the burden of persuasion. 9 This additional effect
given to a presumption is of importance only in those rare cases where
the trier of fact is equipoised at the end of its deliberation. 99 In those
cases, shifting the burden of persuasion means that the trier will
render a verdict against the party who had the burden of rebutting the
presumption.
B. The Burden of Proving the Prima Facie Elements of CERCLA
Liability
As previously discussed, the prima facie elements of a CERCLA
cost-recovery claim which the plaintiff must establish are: (1) the de-
fendant is within one of the four categories of "covered persons;" (2)
there was a "release or threatened release" of a "hazardous sub-
stance;" (3) the plaintiff incurred "response costs;" and (4) the re-
sponse costs were consistent with the NCP. 200 At a used oil
Superfund site where there is evidence of contamnation, but no direct
evidence that the used oil at the site was contaminated by hazardous
substances, a CERCLA plaintiff probably will not have difficulty es-
tablishing the second, third, and fourth elements. With respect to the
second element, since there is contamination by hazardous substances
at the site, the plaintiff will be able to prove that a release of hazard-
ous substances has occurred. 0 1 Similarly, since the plaintiff will have
incurred costs in responding to this contamination, the plaintiff will
have satisfied the requirement that "response costs" be incurred.2"a
197. See Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir.
1981); FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 195, § 69, at 554-55.
198. See, e.g., Presbyterian 653 F.2d at 455 (finding that presumption in favor of a
single bargaining unit shifted both the burdens of production and persuasion); Bur-
dens of Proof, supra note 183, at 68 (noting that a presumption may sometimes shift
the burden of persuasion).
199. Burdens of Proof, supra note 183, at 69.
200. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the prima facie ele-
ments of CERCLA liability); see, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Business Systems,
715 F Supp. at 955; Artesian Water, 659 F Supp. at 1278-79.
201. At first blush, one might assume that the plaintiff at a used oil Superfund site
would have difficulty establishing that a release of a "hazardous substance" has oc-
curred, since there is an issue as to whether CERCLA liability should attach to re-
leases of used oil. At these Superfund sites, however, contamination by hazardous
substances m the environment has already been documented. There probably is also
documentation that the used oil at the site was contamnated with hazardous sub-
stances. The documentation gap occurs in linking specific sources of used oil man-
aged at the site with the hazardous substances in the used oil. That is, generators and
transporters of used oil managed at a Superfund site will assert there is no proof
linking the used oil which they generated or transported with the hazardous sub-
stances at the site. This documentation gap occurs when neither the used oil genera-
tors/transporters nor the used oil management facility tested the specific shipments of
used oil brought to the site.
202. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (defining "response costs").
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The fourth element also will have been satisfied provided the plaintiffs
followed certain requirements to ensure the cost-effectiveness of the
clean-up.20 3
Without a presumption that used oil is contaminated with hazard-
ous substances, a CERCLA plaintiff will have difficulty establishing
the first element - that certain PRPs are "covered persons" under
CERCLA. The four categories of covered persons are: (1) the owner
or operator of the site; (2) prior owners or operators of the site during
which tune the release of hazardous substances occurred; (3) any per-
son who arranged for the disposal, treatment, or transportation of
hazardous substances which contaminated the site; and (4) any person
who accepted for disposal, treatment, or transportation the hazardous
substances which contaminated the site.2 4 Even without a presump-
tion that used oil is contaminated with hazardous substances, CER-
CLA liability will attach to the current and past owners or operators
of a used oil Superfund site. However, the current or past owners or
operators of used oil Superfund sites may be bankrupt or otherwise
unable to pay for the clean-up of the site. 05
The presumption will have a profound effect on the liability of gen-
erators and transporters of used oil managed at a Superfund site.
These generators and transporters will contend that they did not ar-
range or accept for disposal, treatment, or transportation the hazard-
ous substances which contaminated the site.20 6 In other words,
without documentation of the contaminants in the specific shipments
of used oil which they generated or transported, these parties will as-
sert that there is no evidence that the used oil at the site which they
generated or transported was contaminated with hazardous sub-
stances. Those courts which have found that used oil is within the
petroleum exclusion where no direct evidence exists on the identity of
the contaminants in the used oil, in effect, have adopted this
reasoning. 07
203. See supra note 30 (discussing the effect of the requirement that a CERCLA
cleanup be consistent with the NCP).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
205. See Bankruptcy and Environmental Law, supra note 3.
206. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4) (1988).
207. See supra notes 111-119 and accompanying text (discussing the cases where the
court effectively created a presumption that used oil was not contamnated with a
hazardous substance).
Other courts which have considered the allocation of the burden of proof with re-
spect to the first element also have found that the plaintiff bears the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant's waste contained a hazardous substance, such that the
defendant was a "covered person" for purposes of CERCLA liability. For example,
in Exxon, 633 F Supp. at 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court observed that
[f]or purposes of its complaint, the [private-party plaintiff] has alleged a suf-
ficient basis for its claim, which is that [the defendant] generated and con-
tracted for the transport of industrial waste containing substances which are
defined as hazardous substances under the Act [CERCLA]. In order for
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C. Basis For the Presumption
Consideration of the basic principles for establishing presumptions
results in the conclusion that a rebuttable presumption should exist
that used oil is contaminated with a hazardous substance to which
CERCLA liability attaches. This presumption will require a CER-
CLA defendant to prove that used oil managed at a Superfund site
was not contaminated with a hazardous substance. In demonstrating
the appropriateness of this presumption, the analysis below considers
factors identified by the Supreme Court in Basic 0 for evaluating the
appropriateness of presumptions: congressional policy, fairness, and
probability.20 9
1. Probability
One authority has observed that generally "the most important con-
sideration in the creation of presumptions is probability. ' 210 With re-
spect to this factor, a recent EPA analysis of the composition of used
oi211 performed in conjunction with EPA's rulemakings governing
used oil management standards212 demonstrates the high probability
that used oil from a variety of sources is contaminated with hazardous
[the defendant] to be liable, the [plaintiff] must prove that the wastes did in
fact contain such hazardous substances
Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
Similarly, m O'Neil, 682 F Supp. at 706, the court found that the plaintiff failed to
provide sufficient evidence that the defendant's materials contained CERCLA haz-
ardous substances. Id. at 723-24. The O'Neil plaintiff provided no evidence as to the
contents of the defendant's containers other than the assertions of a witness who had
not performed an analysis of the contents. Id. at 723. By contrast, the defendant
presented the testimony of a witness who testified that the contents were not nor
would not form a hazardous substance. Id. From this, the court concluded that the
plaintiff failed to meet its burden of production with respect to the presence of a
hazardous substance. Id. at 723-24.
Other courts that have considered the first element have concluded that there is no
requirement that a CERCLA plaintiff trace the defendant's waste to a specific release
of a hazardous substance at a site. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160,
169 n.15 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Fairchild Indus., 766 F Supp. 405, 415 (D.
Md. 1991); Exxon, 633 F Supp. at 620; United States v. Wade, 577 F Supp. 1326, 1333
(E.D. Pa. 1983). Instead, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to present evidence that the
defendant shipped waste to a site and that a hazardous substance similar to those
contained m the waste remained at the site at the time of the release or threatened
release. Id. Nevertheless, these decisions still require the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's waste contained a hazardous substance. Id.
208. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46.
209. Id.
210. MCCORMICK, supra note 183, § 343, at 969.
211. Used Oil Characterization Sampling and Analysis Program - Final Report, Sci-
ence Applications International Corporation (August 30, 1991) [hereinafter Used Oil
Analysis].
212. In 1989, EPA commissioned the Used Oil Analysis to provide updated mfor-
mation on the composition of used oils from various sources. See Hazardous Waste
Management System; General; Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste; Used
Oil, 56 Fed. Reg. 48,000, 48,006 (EPA proposed rule 1991). The results of the Used
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substances. This Used Oil Analysis contradicts EPA's statement in
the 1987 Memorandum that used oil is not necessarily contaminated
with hazardous substances. 13
The Used Oil Analysis examined the composition of the following
categories of used oil: automotive oil and fluids; diesel engine crank-
case oil; marine oil; hydraulic oil and fluids; metalworking oil; electri-
cal insulating oil; natural gas-fired engine oil; aircraft engine oil; and
aircraft engine oil and fluids in storage tanks.2 14 The Used Oil Analy-
sis found that used oil from gasoline-powered engines (e.g., automo-
tive crankcase, marine, and piston-engine aircraft) typically exhibited
the toxicity characteristic215 of a hazardous waste.21 6 The Used Oil
Analysis also found samples of hydraulic oil, metalworking oil, and
Oil Analysis are discussed in EPA's September 1991 Proposal to list certain categories
of used oil destined for recycling as hazardous waste. 56 Fed. Reg. 48,006-48,019.
In the 1987 Memorandum, EPA noted that used oil does not necessarily contain
non-indigenous hazardous substances or hazardous substances m elevated levels.
1987 Memorandum, supra note 62, at 10. As support for this proposition, EPA cited
data submitted by a commentator m response to EPA proposed rulemakmg listing
used oil as a hazardous waste. Id. at 10 n.7 (citing Comments of the Utility Solid
Waste Activities Group, Appendix C (Feb. 11, 1986)). However, the Used Oil Analy-
sis is a better measure of the likelihood of used oil containing hazardous substances
given its more recent analytical data.
213. See 1987 Memorandum, supra note 62, at 10.
214. Used Oil Analysis, Table III.C.1; 56 Fed. Reg. 48,007
215. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (1992) (establishing the requirements for satisfying the
toxicity characteristic of a hazardous waste).
216. In particular, the number of used oil samples per used oil category that exhib-
ited the toxicity characteristic of a hazardous waste were as follows:
Used Oil Category Toxicity Characteristic
Automotive Crankcase Oil - 75
Unleaded Gasoline Engines
Automotive Oils/Fluids - 100
Storage Tank Samples
Diesel Trucks and Buses - 10
Crankcase Oil
Diesel Trucks/Buses - Storage 70
Tank Samples
Diesel Heavy Equipment - 0
Crankcase Oil
Diesel Railroad Engine - 20
Crankcase Oil
Marine Oil - Manna Used ORl 86
Storage Tank Samples
Hydraulic Oils/Fluids 45
Metalworking Oils/Fluids 17
Electrical Insulating Oil 0
Natural Gas-Fired Engine Oil 20
Aircraft Engine Oil
- Thrbojet Aircraft 0
- Piston Engine Aircraft 100
Aircraft Oils/Fluids - Storage 86
Tank Samples
Used Oil Analysis, Table III.C.5; see 56 Fed. Reg. 48,018.
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natural gas-fired engine oil which exhibited the toxicity charactens-
tic. 217 To exhibit the toxicity characteristic, these categories of used
oil had to contain elevated levels of a hazardous substance.218 Thus,
probability supports creating a presumption that used oil is contami-
nated with a hazardous substance.
Establishing a presumption that used oil is contaminated with haz-
ardous substances is analogous to EPA's decision to create a presump-
tion that transformers containing mineral oil dielectric fluid are
contaminated with PCBs.2 19 PCB-contammated electric equipment
contains PCBs in concentrations of fifty or greater, but less than 500
parts per million (ppm).22 EPA established its presumption in 1979
on the basis of data which indicated that thirty-eight percent of the
mineral-oil transformers contained PCBs in concentrations between
50 and 500 ppm.22 1 By contrast, the Used Oil Analysis found that
half of the sixteen categories of used oil exhibited the toxicity charac-
tenstic of a hazardous waste.222 Therefore, the data on the toxicity of
used oil is more compelling than the data EPA used for creating its
presumption that mineral-oil transformers are contaminated by PCBs.
2. Fairness to Litigants
There are two fairness grounds for creating a presumption that used
oil is contaminated with a hazardous substance. First, requiring a
CERCLA plaintiff to prove the identity of contaminants in a defend-
ant's used oil places an unnecessarily high burden on the plaintiff.2z
As between a CERCLA plaintiff and a defendant who generated or
transported used oil to a Superfund site, the defendant generator or
217. Id.
218. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (1992). However, it is not necessary for used oil to
meet the toxacity characteristic in order to satisfy the requirements for becoming a
hazardous substance under CERCLA. Rather, m order to result in CERCLA liabil-
ity, it is sufficient that the used oil contains a hazardous substance at a level greater
than that which was m the oil prior to usage. This is consistent with the determination
by several courts that a hazardous substance does not have to be in a certain mim-
mum concentration or toxicity level to result in CERCLA liability. See Western
Processmg, 761 F Supp. at 722; Exxon, 744 F Supp. at 484; Carolawn, 21 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) at 2126 n.3; United States v. Wade, 577 F Supp. 1326, 1340-41 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
219. See Disposal of Polychlornated Biphenyls, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,738, 26,741 (EPA
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking 1991); Polychlormated Biphenyls (PCBs)
Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce and Use Prohibitions, 44 Fed.
Reg. 31,514, 31,517 (EPA final rule 1979).
220. See 40 C.F.R. § 761.3 (1992).
221. See 44 Fed. Reg. 31,517.
222. See Used Oil Analysis, Tables Ill.C.3A-3D; 56 Fed. Reg. 48,009-11.
223. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1991) (creat-
ing a rebuttable presumption against the defendant because of the "unnecessarily un-
realistic evidentiary burden" that would have been placed on the plaintiffs).
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transporter is in a better position to determine the composition of the
oil.- 4 As stated by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hayes.225
It is well settled that in the interest of fairness the burden of proof
ordinarily resting upon one party as to a disputed issue may shift to
his adversary when the true facts relating to the disputed issue lie
peculiarly within the knowledge of the latter. 2 6
The Western Processing court used this rationale to find that the
petroleum exclusion did not apply to a defendant who had not pro-
vided information on the composition of its tanks which stored and
may have contaminated used oil sludge with hazardous substances. 2 7
This reasoning was also followed in Zands v. Nelson- 8 where a Cali-
forma federal district court shifted the burden to prior owners and
operators of a contaminated property to show that contamination did
not occur during their ownership or operation of the property.229 The
Zands court observed that prior owners and operators could have
tested the property at the end of their ownership and operation to
demonstrate the absence of contamination, whereas the current owner
or operator did not have this option.-30 The court shifted the burden
to the prior owners and operators to avoid the illogical and unjust
result where a plaintiff could prove that contamination occurred prior
to its acquisition of the property, but could be denied recovery be-
224. In an economic analysis, the CERCLA defendant is the "cheapest cost
avoider" who is best able to determine the composition of the used oil. See Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1066 (1972).
225. 369 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1966).
226. Id. at 676.
227. Western Processing, 761 F Supp. at 722. Without deciding the ultimate ques-
tion of liability, a presumption that used oil is outside the scope of the petroleum
exclusion places the burden of proving the composition of the used oil on the party
who can do so most economically and efficiently. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc.,
589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978), winch, m a water pollution case, observed that
the party engaged in the potentially polluting enterprise is m the best posi-
tion to estimate the risk of accidental pollution and plan accordingly, as by
raising its prices or purchasing insurance. Economically, it makes sense to
place the cost of pollution on the enterprise which statistically will cause
pollution and in fact does cause pollution. We do not, however, here decide
the question of ultimate liability.
Id. at 1314-15 (footnotes omitted).
228. 797 F Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992).
229. Id. at 815-17
230. Id. at 817 Specifically, the Zands court observed that
the owner/operator defendants had the best opportunity to gather evidence
that would have proven when the contamination occurred. Each defendant
could have tested the soil at the end of his or her ownership and operation of
the property. Such a test would potentially have proven the absence of con-
tammation when a given defendant separated from the property, thereby
enabling that defendant to prove he or she did not cause the contamination.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, did not have this option.
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cause it was unable to prove which specific prior owner or operator
caused the contamnation. 1 1
Second, the absence of a rebuttable presumption that used oil is
contaminated with hazardous substances rewards CERCLA defend-
ants for maintaining poor documentation on the composition of used
oil. That is, the absence of a rebuttable presumption encourages par-
ties to behave in a less environmentally responsible manner (e.g.,
avoiding determining the contaminants in their used oil). In addition,
there is no disincentive to discourage used oil generators and trans-
porters from having their used oil recycled or disposed at a poorly run
facility, since the environmental contamination resulting from this
poor management will not affect these generators and transporters.
Indeed, facilities which do not take safeguards to provide for the envi-
ronmentally sound management of used oil will expenence a cost sav-
ings which they can pass on to the generators and transporters. By
contrast, a rebuttable presumption that used oil is outside the petro-
leum exclusion encourages used oil generators and transporters to
monitor the quality of used oil management facilities3 2
3. Congressional Policy
Congress enacted CERCLA to achieve two broad objectives: to fa-
cilitate the prompt clean up of sites contaminated by hazardous sub-
stances and to hold those parties responsible for the contamination
liable for the clean up costs.233 Creating a presumption that used oil is
contaminated with a hazardous substance is consistent with both of
these objectives. With respect to the first objective, a presumption
that used oil is contaminated with a hazardous substance provides an
incentive for parties who generated, transported or otherwise man-
aged used oil at a Superfund site to participate in the clean up of the
site. In the absence of this presumption, these parties have little in-
231. Id. at 816. See FOWLER V HARPER ET AL., 4 T-m LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at
103 n.26 (2d ed. 1986) (in a discussion of negligence cases, observing that "[wjhenever
a procedural rule will consistently work to subvert substantive justice, it should be
scrutinized to see whether any fundamental guarantee requires the rule to persist m
such a form").
232. This argument for a rebuttable presumption that used oil is outside the petro-
leum exclusion parallels the argument favoring the imposition of strict liability under
CERCLA, rather than negligence. In arguing for the imposition of strict liability
under CERCLA, one commentator advanced the following argument, which applies
equally to creation of the rebuttable presumption advocated in this Article:
By forcing corporations involved in toxic waste disposal to internalize
cleanup costs, strict liability serves as the most efficient means of encourag-
ing the development of safer waste disposal techniques. If companies know
in advance that they will be liable for any releases with which they are asso-
ciated, they will continue to seek newer and safer methods of waste disposal.
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 14, at 1519-20.
233. H.R. REP. No. 253 (III), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038; see Artesian Water, 659 F Supp. at 1276-77.
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centive to participate in the clean up of the Superfund site, thus delay-
mg the clean-up process.
A rebuttable presumption that releases of used oil are outside the
petroleum exclusion is also consistent with CERCLA's second policy
objective. Without such a presumption, there is the potential for the
anomalous situation where used oil at a Superfund site is known to be
contaminated with hazardous substances, but the generators and
transporters of this used oil escape CERCLA liability because there is
no documentation that the specific used oil generated or transported
by these parties was contaminated with hazardous substances. This
poor documentation will sield the generators and transporters from
CERCLA liability. This result undermines Congress' intent to hold
the parties responsible for the contamination at Superfund sites liable
for the clean up costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the widespread presence of used oil at Superfund sites, litiga-
tion over the scope of the petroleum exclusion to CERCLA liability is
likely to continue. This Article provides an analytical framework for
understanding the scope of the petroleum exclusion. The conclusion
of EPA and the courts that gasoline and other fuels are within the
petroleum exclusion, but that used oil and other petroleum products
contaimng non-indigenous hazardous substances are outside the ex-
clusion, is supported by the plain meaning and legislative history of
the statute.
The plain meaning of the exclusion and CERCLA's legislative Ins-
tory do not provide guidance for the more problematic situation in-
volving releases of hazardous substances at a used oil Superfund site
where there is no evidence of the contaminants in the used oil brought
to the site. This Article proposes addressing this situation by creating
a rebuttable presumption that used oil is contaminated by a hazardous
substance. The practical effect of this presumption is that CERCLA
liability will attach to releases of used oil, unless the defendant can put
forth evidence demonstrating that the used oil was not contaminated
by hazardous substances. This presumption places the burden of
proving the absence of contaminants in used oil on the party in the
best position to make this determination - the defendant. This pre-
sumption is consistent with the objectives of CERCLA, promotes fair-
ness, and reflects the probability that used oil is contaminated by
hazardous substances.
